Richard L. Revesz

Richard L. Revesz is the Lawrence King Professor at New York University School of Law. Professor Revesz also previously served as the Dean of the New York University School of Law. His work focuses on the use of cost-benefit analysis, the allocation of regulatory responsibility in a federal system, and the design of liability regimes

Undoing the Regulatory Policies of the Trump Administration

Undoing the Regulatory Policies of the Trump Administration

The Administration has taken an aggressive approach in using legal tools to advance its regulatory agenda.

Regulatory Rollbacks Have Changed the Nature of Presidential Power

Regulatory Rollbacks Have Changed the Nature of Presidential Power

Strategies used by the Trump Administration will serve as a blueprint for future Presidents.

A Distinction in Agency Design Without a Difference

A Distinction in Agency Design Without a Difference

The Solicitor General says it is constitutionally relevant that one person heads the CFPB, but it is not.

EPA Will Say Anything to Avoid Addressing Climate Change

EPA Will Say Anything to Avoid Addressing Climate Change

New carbon rule is entirely at odds with Trump Administration’s earlier rhetoric on the Clean Power Plan.

Achieving Climate Goals Will Require Sound Energy Storage Policies

Achieving Climate Goals Will Require Sound Energy Storage Policies

Clean energy systems will not reduce emissions unless states promote effective energy storage policies.

Responding to Anti-Regulatory Tropes

Responding to Anti-Regulatory Tropes

Marchand’s argument questions key regulatory processes and ignores the net benefits of regulation.

Challenging the Anti-Regulatory Narrative

Challenging the Anti-Regulatory Narrative

The Clean Air Act’s success reveals the flaws in the standard critique of the administrative state.

Structural Reforms to Improve Cost-Benefit Analyses of Financial Regulation

Structural Reforms to Improve Cost-Benefit Analyses of Financial Regulation

Independent agencies should mirror executive branch practices to overcome judicial scrutiny.

An Empirical Analysis of the Establishment of Independent Agencies

An Empirical Analysis of the Establishment of Independent Agencies

A divided government may not fully explain the creation of agencies not directly controllable by the President.

The Tragic Flaw of the Clean Air Act

The Tragic Flaw of the Clean Air Act

Scholars examine the history and consequences of the Clear Air Act’s exemption of existing industrial facilities.

The False Dichotomy of Agency Independence

The False Dichotomy of Agency Independence

Different agency design choices result in a continuum of independence.