Why U.S. Nuclear Licensing Moves So Slowly

As communities confront the real-world costs of global climate change—from more frequent and more severe weather events to mounting pressure on agricultural systems—climate change advocates continue to press for rapid reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. Fossil-fuel-based electricity generation contributes more than 40 percent of global carbon emissions, making the electric generation sector a critical front for decarbonization. Demand for electricity is poised to grow rapidly as the Global South electrifies, electric vehicles increase in popularity, and demand for Artificial Intelligence services grow. Meeting that demand while cutting emissions will likely require cost- and time-efficient, repeatable, deployment of low-carbon generation technologies that can deliver reliable power at industrial scale.

Nuclear energy offers one such low-carbon energy source, leading some analysts to contend that nuclear energy is vital to reducing the electricity generation sector’s carbon emissions and avoid the worst impacts of global climate change. Nuclear plants generate large quantities of electricity with low direct carbon emissions and provide year-round, consistent baseline energy generation capacity.

The United States boasts a rich history of nuclear innovation. The world’s first commercial-scale nuclear reactor opened in Shippingport, Pennsylvania in December 1957. In the following years, leading American companies and institutions, including Westinghouse, General Electric, and Argonne National Laboratory, designed and deployed first-in-the-world, innovative reactor designs still in use today. The United States operates the world’s largest nuclear-generation portfolio, with 94 nuclear power reactors across 54 power plants collectively generating approximately 30 percent of global nuclear energy.

Yet, nuclear power supplies a much smaller share of U.S. electricity—18.2 percent—than in peer nations. France and South Korea generate substantially larger portions of their electricity from nuclear energy—67.3 percent and 31.7 percent respectively—and each has continued building new plants and reactors at a pace the United States has not matched.

U.S. nuclear development has lagged behind larger rivals as well. Since 2000, the United States has brought only three new commercial reactors online—Watts Bar 2 in 2016, Vogtle 3 in 2023, and Vogtle 4 in 2024. Since 2014 alone, China has nearly tripled its nuclear energy production and currently has 27 reactors under construction.

Commentators offer several explanations for why the United States has struggled to translate its nuclear design expertise and storied nuclear construction experience into rapid new-reactor deployment. Some analysts highlight economic forces stymieing U.S. nuclear development including competition from cheap natural gas, changing electricity markets, high financing and construction costs, and execution risk. In addition, some experts argue that unresolved long-term waste disposal politics and limited repository options contribute to slower American deployment. Yet more analysts focus on the complexity and delays nuclear licensing regulations create.

In today’s Saturday seminar, experts consider regulatory reforms to encourage the deployment and modernization of American nuclear energy.

• In a report for the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Stephen Burdick, Jess Gehin, and John Wagner of the Idaho National Laboratory present legislative and agency recommendations to streamline nuclear licensing. The authors advocate statutory reforms to clarify administrative authority over energy regulation and streamline processes where multiple agencies’ roles and authorities overlap. To make the transition to nuclear energy more efficient, the authors propose expansive interpretations of key enabling statutes to allow agencies to bypass bureaucratic roadblocks. For example, they cite provisions in the Atomic Energy Act that may be read to provide the Department of Energy with authority to permit all non-commercial nuclear reactor projects without a license from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).
• In a recent report, Matt Bowen and Rama Ponangi of Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy offer recommendations to simplify U.S. nuclear licensing while maintaining legal compliance and review quality. Bowen and Ponangi detail NRC’s environmental review processes and identify elements that unnecessarily complicate nuclear licensing and create bottlenecks. They suggest the NRC remove or significantly scale back the “need for power” and “alternatives” sections of its review disclosure template—the Environmental Impact Statement. Bowen and Ponangi argue these sections, which require utilities to show a need for any newly proposed generation capacity and an assessment of non-nuclear alternatives, are of little value and are contrary to congressional commands yet require significant analysis to complete and review.
• In a Johns Hopkins University dissertation, Maeley Brown identifies numerous economic, political, legal, and infrastructure-related barriers to deploying advanced nuclear reactors in the United States. Brown highlights inconsistent political support for nuclear energy across administrations as one reason why the U.S. lacks the legal and physical infrastructure needed to efficiently incorporate advanced nuclear reactor designs. She points to statutory reforms, such as the 2019 Nuclear Energy Innovation and Modernization Act, that may limit inconsistency at the administrative and executive level. Brown argues that, for the United States to maintain global nuclear leadership, it must develop a robust domestic nuclear power industry and urges the creation of domestic supply chains for the manufacturing and operation of advanced reactors.
• In an article for the Environmental Law Institute’s Environmental Law Reporter, Texas Law’s David Adelman, Harvard Law’s Sommer Engels and Andrew Mergen, and the University of Utah’s Jamie Pleune argue that nuclear permitting reform should not be premised on deregulation. The authors identify four deregulatory myths that wrongly single out federal environmental reviews, permitting, and associated litigation as the primary licensing bottleneck for U.S. nuclear projects. They cite studies finding delays often stem from limited administrative capacity at NRC and related agencies, confusion surrounding administrative roles and jurisdictions, applicant-caused holdups, and other legal requirements—not the difficulty or rigor of NEPA requirements. The authors propose investing in agency funding, staffing, and training and improving interagency coordination to reduce redundant standards.
• In an Energy Policy article, the University of British Columbia’s V. Ramana and practitioner Kerrie Blaise warn that Canada’s efforts to promote nuclear energy—particularly cutting-edge small modular reactors (SMRs)—may erode regulatory oversight. They cite Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) officials’ statements, industry lobbying, and incentives for former regulators to move into regulated industries as factors undermining confidence in CNSC’s objectivity. Ramana and Blaise warn that pro-nuclear bias may influence CNSC’s efforts to exempt SMRs from environmental assessments and caution that CNSC action ahead of statutory reforms could weaken oversight over untested designs without democratic buy-in. They recommend shifting environmental oversight to another ministry, tightening employment restrictions on former regulators, and keeping SMRs subject to environmental impact assessment.
• In an Energies article, Tsinghua University’s Haifeng Deng and Zihuai Tang argue that a global push for more nuclear power will require nations to adopt comprehensive nuclear-policy frameworks. Deng and Tang assess China’s Fourteenth Five-Year Energy Plan (effective 2021-2025) as a potential model for international reforms. They diagnose shortcomings in the Plan—including insufficient statutory support for industry and ambiguous nuclear-safety rules that blur regulatory authority and responsibility. The authors propose passing atomic energy laws with supporting regulations, including intellectual property provisions aligned with patent law and incentives for private capital alongside state support. Deng and Tang recommend separating promotion from safety oversight by clarifying roles among related regulators and state energy sponsors, and strengthening disclosure and public participation requirements.