Trading Abundant Procedures for Abundant “Things”

Momentum for cutting red tape is growing, but reformers must navigate challenges and muster political capital.

A few years ago, an article appeared that gave me “déjà vu all over again,” as Yogi Berra would say. It was The Procedural Fetish, written by Nicholas Bagley at the University of Michigan Law School, and its premise was that the administrative process had become not the friend but the enemy of progress. I can only compare my reaction to it to that of another pathbreaking article, The New Property, by Yale law professor Charles Reich, which was published in 1964 and which I have long felt was the most influential law review article ever written. These two articles, written over 60 years apart, stand as counterpoints in the evolution of the administrative state.

Reich established that substantive property rights should attach to government benefits such as welfare payments, grants, licenses, and the like. But he also pushed for full adjudicative procedures to implement those rights, and this led to cases such as Goldberg v. Kelly that required the procedural equivalent of formal adjudication before a recipient could be removed from state welfare rolls. Later cases such as Mathews v. Eldridge cut back on the formality requirement, but the procedures remained robust.

When I debated Reich some 25 years after his transformative article, he would not budge from his demand for full adjudicative process. In my view at that time, protecting those on welfare rolls by demanding trial-like procedures before removal favored individuals erroneously on the rolls over those trying to get on, lengthened the queue, and ended up denying access to many deserving claimants.

In the years to follow, the ill effects of procedural fetish only grew more evident to me. When I was chairman of the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS), the agency championed the use of video hearings, especially in mass justice cases such as those at the Social Security Administration (SSA), where in-person disability cases before administrative law judges (ALJs) expended considerable time in travel and rescheduling that slowed down the decision process and lengthened the queue. The SSA agreed to set up a central video hearing decision center, and ultimately a significant percentage of cases were heard this way. When I tried to expand the video hearing concept to other agencies, some ALJs pushed back: “We need to see the witnesses to determine credibility,” they basically said. The argument that a face-to-face hearing is the only fair process was a position that lawyers, at least trial lawyers, fervently supported, as did the American Bar Association. Procedural innovations in the form of video hearings turned out to be controversial, despite tested outcomes that showed a near equality of results with in-person hearing procedures.

My experience with the immigration bar was even more frustrating. Representation of asylum seekers is very difficult given the remote locations of entry points and the need for timely disposition. At ACUS, I had worked out an arrangement with immigration officials at the U.S. Department of Justice to allow for video representation at several inaccessible locations where lawyers for defendants were largely unavailable. The plan was to locate a secure site and let lawyers confer remotely with their clients before they appeared, again remotely, before an immigration judge. I then went to one of the leading public interest organizations to share the good news and enlist its support. But I was met with reticence: “What, no face to face?” the head of the organization said. “My lawyers won’t let me support this.” I responded that whatever one thinks of video representation, is not some representation better than none? I did not have The Procedural Fetish to refer to at that time, but I was expressing many of its insights. I was experiencing directly what Bagley wrote about when he said we need to overcome “resistance to a reform agenda that would undo counterproductive procedural rules.” Face-to-face hearings are Exhibit A in this regard.

Of course, excessive process claims apply not just to adjudication, but, as importantly, to rulemaking and regulation. Rules often affect a broader public than adjudications, and their consequences are widely felt. The processes surrounding the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and permitting requirements at the state and federal level are of even greater concern since many important infrastructure projects are unreasonably delayed or even abandoned.

Professor Bagley’s article did much more than remind me of past mistakes. It became a central thesis of the “abundance” idea itself. The book Abundance, by Ezra Klein and Derek Thompson, asks why our society can no longer build things such as housing and infrastructure more generally. Citing Bagley, Klein and Thompson say: “Liberal legalism—and through it, liberal government—had become process-obsessed rather than outcomes-oriented.” They go on to cite many instances where process frustrates development. Not surprisingly, the failure to build housing heads the list.

Living part of the year in San Francisco, where home prices are among the highest in the country and the NIMBY v. YIMBY debate rages, I see the problem close up. But it is a national phenomenon, and the federal government is a big contributor. President Joseph R. Biden’s infrastructure legislation is a sad case in point. Much of what was appropriated did not get spent because projects could not get built. For example, the plan to build 500,000 or so electric-charging stations imploded. Only a small portion were actually built by the end of President Biden’s term.

Other recent works, such as the book Why Nothing Works by Marc J. Dunkelman, demonstrate how large projects, such as the Northeast electric power grid, could not overcome environmental and permitting challenges. Democrats are finally realizing that they are part of the problem, and momentum is building for change. Really, it is more than momentum—Abundance is becoming a movement.

Bagley has joined that movement with his latest book, Why We Can’t Have Nice Things. This is The Procedural Fetish writ large. To nail his thesis, Bagley subtitles his book How Legal Reformers Accidentally Broke America. Quite a charge. It raises many questions. First, can he sustain his charge? Second, what chance does he have of getting a “conviction”? Will the “guilty” parties, such as the public interest and environmental legal community, want to buy in? It is asking a lot for organizations such as Public Citizen to modify their procedural challenges to agency actions. It is difficult to accept blame for actions taken in good faith that have had many positive outcomes but have slowed down the regulatory process considerably.

Bagley must also confront more important players than the public interest community. How will Congress and the courts react? Not much can happen without their participation and support. But Bagley is prepared for the fight. He proposes two categories of reform: Fix the courts, and fix the process legislatively by rebuilding state capacity. In the former category, he seeks to end hard look review, limit standing, ditch the presumption of reviewability, and limit remedies. He has a good case to make for each of these reforms, and, given the conservative bent of the U.S. Supreme Court, he may find judicial support at the highest levels.

Hard look review might be the easiest target. Bagley cites Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Committee v. U.S. Atomic Energy Commission and Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe as cases that introduced intense judicial oversight of agency rules and informal action. This led reviewing courts to demand detailed explanations from agencies at the pain of reversal or remand, thereby effectively nullifying or delaying administrative action. As all administrative law professors know, this is a large subject with many dimensions. The debate over Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council and its recent overruling by the Supreme Court is only one recent manifestation.

Rather than taking on all facets of judicial oversight here, let me just point out what the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) originally intended with respect to informal rulemaking under Section 553. Three ingredients: notice, comment, and a “concise” statement of reasons. But after the Supreme Court decided that informal rulemaking would largely replace formal rulemaking in United States v. Florida East Coast Railway, a strange thing began to happen. Procedures were added judicially to make truly informal rulemaking unrecognizable. The hard look doctrine, championed by Judge Harold Leventhal and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, led reviewing courts to find errors in fact-finding or failures of logic. The closer the courts looked, the larger the errors, a kind of judicial equivalent to the haiku principle that “little things seen close up are large.” Agencies reacted predictably to hard look judicial review by growing concise statements to treatise-like proportions: tens of thousands of pages in the Federal Register across many rulemakings.

In addition to his position opposing hard look review, Bagley’s positions on limiting standing and remedies are likely to be viewed favorably by the judiciary. Indeed, the Supreme Court seems eager to lead the way in this regard. Recent cases limiting standing and tightening judicial     authority to issue remedies are emblematic.

Undergirding Bagley’s approach to the judicial role in supervising the regulatory state is another pathbreaking article he has written, entitled The Puzzling Presumption of Reviewability. By questioning the presumption of reviewability, Bagley takes on the legal orthodoxy reflected in numerous cases and commentaries. Yet, in the end, he comes away with the more convincing argument. The APA is usually cited as the basis for the presumption, but the statutory evidence is thin. The Constitution embodies it, but only for constitutional claims. In the administrative law setting, the presumption does the most damage by permitting pre-enforcement review under Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner. Reversing that decision would give informal rules promulgated by agencies a much better chance of surviving judicial review and speed up the regulatory process. It is surely an open question whether the Supreme Court will buy it, but in my estimation the Court will move in that direction.

One example is Seven County Infrastructure v. Eagle County, Colorado. Seven County was a unanimous decision that instructed the D.C. Circuit to limit the reach of NEPA: “The bedrock principle of judicial review in NEPA cases can be stated in a word: Deference.” For a Court that earlier ended Chevron deference, those are stunning words. “Deference” and “defer” are  mentioned numerous times in Justice Brett Kavanaugh’s majority opinion. In stating that “Congress did not design NEPA for judges to hamstring new infrastructure and construction projects,” Justice Kavanaugh sounds like he has joined the abundance movement. If that is so, Bagley’s reforms may get a positive reception.

Another indicator of judicial support for Bagley’s abundance ideas is the revival of interest in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power v. Natural Resources Defense Council. Actually, law professor Adam Crews calls this revival a “renaissance.” Vermont Yankee stands for the proposition that the courts cannot add procedures to informal rulemaking, something I and others have been advocating for many years. By returning to the “original” understanding of notice and comment rulemaking, agency rules can be promulgated faster, and judicial remands should be fewer. As rulemaking speeds up, abundance goals become more feasible.

As open to Bagley’s reforms as the judiciary may seem to be, Congress could be even more receptive. Members of Congress on both sides of the aisle are increasingly becoming aware that America cannot build things. The abundance movement is coming to Washington, D.C. The Build America Caucus, a bipartisan group of 40 members, argues for “a government that works” and seeks to fast-track housing projects to reduce the 5 million home deficit America faces. Once a new Congress is sworn in, support for this caucus should grow considerably. Moreover, members of Congress will have the opportunity to consider and vote on two pieces of legislation that seek to address the inability of government at all levels to act. The Standardizing Permitting and Expediting Economic Development Act (SPEED Act) limits NEPA reviews to expedite decision-making. Another bill, the Bipartisan American Affordability and Jobs Act (BAAJA), is premised on a widespread view that construction productivity has receded in America since 1970. It would limit NEPA, National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), and Endangered Species Act (ESA) reviews to remands only and forbid injunctions altogether. It appears to pick up on Bagley’s proposal to limit judicial remedies. BAAJA has drawn applause from The New York Times editorial board but also criticism from astute observers such as David Tatel, a prominent former judge on the D.C. Circuit. Its fate is not assured.

Obviously, these bills will go through the legislative process and, even if passed, may not turn out the way they appear now. But what is undeniable is that there is an enthusiasm for solving problems growing in Congress that must be applauded. Maybe we can have nice things, after all.

As I said at the outset, Bagley is very tough on the public interest community, essentially accusing it of “breaking” America. In an odd way it is a compliment, since few members of that community ever thought they had that much power. But I do not think Bagley wants his supporters to come from the conservative side alone. The New Civil Liberties Alliance, I am sure, will embrace much of what he suggests, but its goal is to stymie and ultimately end the administrative state. That is not Bagley’s goal, nor mine. It becomes a substance versus procedure debate. I admire Charles Reich for creating the “new property” as a right, even as I reject his procedures for implementing it. Public interest lawyers did much to expand that right too, but can they now be enlisted to fix the procedural problem? It will not be easy. We will all miss “hard look” review in certain situations. For example, who cannot love the idea that the Arlington, Virginia, county board is seeking hard look review of President Donald J. Trump’s decision to create a “triumphal” arch? But it can and should win with just arbitrary and capricious review. This is the kind of readjustment many in the public interest bar will have to go through for Bagley to win them over.

In terms of infrastructure reform, Bagley seems to be seeking a middle ground between urban design theorist Jane Jacobs and urban planner Robert Moses. He does not want adherents of Jacobs’s views to hold up projects for narrow community interests that protect insiders versus those who need housing—that is, in Reich’s terms, protecting those on the welfare rolls versus those trying to get on. But he also does not want to give the Robert Moseses of the world unchecked bureaucratic power to bulldoze neighborhoods. He really wants a responsible Robert Moses, a bureaucrat who listens before acting and works within a management structure that has internal checks on arbitrary action. Not a pure “power broker,” as Robert Caro called Moses, but an enlightened power broker. Amazingly, Robert Caro has seemingly agreed: “I certainly don’t want someone who is ruthless and disregarding public opinion. But at the same time, we need someone who is going to get things built.”

Bagley hopes that getting results—that is, building things—will restore faith and trust in government. That is a big ask in today’s political world, with public trust in government sitting at historic lows. He knows that, but he has nowhere else to turn. Perhaps he is naïve. If so, I still applaud him.

America currently lacks adequate state capacity. President Trump’s so-called Department of Governmental Efficiency (DOGE) emptied out the bureaucracy. Key civil servants were removed and important agencies decimated, such as the Departments of State and Justice and, of course, the U.S. Agency for International Development. Many agencies have been affected. The National Weather Service, for example, cannot provide the same predictions of tornadoes anymore because DOGE fired the experts who do such work.

Bagley proposes civil service reforms that will permit the hiring of highly talented individuals who want to serve. He hopes, in fact, to get public interest lawyers on the inside, rather than having them critique administrative action solely from the outside. The “gift” DOGE gave us is that there are now 300,000 to 400,000 positions open in the civil service.

What is needed now is a call to service much like the one John Fitzgerald Kennedy issued in 1961. And once federal agencies are restaffed, these public servants must be permitted greater latitude to decide things themselves, without the courts closely scrutinizing all their decisions.

This raises questions about the legitimacy of the decisions made by these civil servants. But these questions can be answered. Francis Fukuyama, for example, has argued for giving decision power back to the bureaucracy to reduce “veto points,” and Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule have argued in their book, Law and Leviathan, for the morality of administrative law to be restored, drawing on the framework provided by Lon Fuller in his 1962 work, The Morality of Law. They cite Fuller’s insistence that “the internal morality of law is and cannot be a morality appropriate for every kind of government action.” Fuller places “managerial decision-making” outside law’s morality. Many hard decisions fall into this category even under the APA. Managerial decision-making is not the Wild West. It does not free an enlightened Robert Moses from following rules before acting. Years ago, Jerry Mashaw coined the phrase “managerial due process.” That is the realm we must now enter if government is to build things again.

A final point bears mention about managerial legitimacy. This point is addressed not to public interest lawyers, but to the other group that must be brought along: law professors. Lawyers love litigation, and that affection is often carried over to the classroom. Some of the best “war stories” by faculty revolve around David and Goliath encounters. This is a tough bias to moderate. But new heroes must be found if agency decisions are to survive judicial intervention. Michael Lewis has provided them in his recent books.

Today’s legal academics need to consider these works and management principles more generally. Law professors might contact colleagues in business schools and public policy programs to help in this effort. As a former law school dean, I have come late to this insight. But my efforts recently have focused on transferring principles of agile management to the bureaucracy. The central problem for government at all levels is how to get decisions made both fairly and efficiently. Law schools have for too long leaned heavily on the fairness side of that equation. Professor Bagley has revived and refined our thinking in this regard. It is now time for the legal establishment to consider and, where appropriate, act on his transformative work.

Paul R. Verkuil

Paul R. Verkuil is a senior fellow of the Administrative Conference of the United States and the National Academy of Public Administration.