Scholars argue that immigration courts invert traditional venue principles, enabling systemic unfairness and government forum shopping.
After the federal government arrested Mahmoud Khalil in New York, it transferred him across multiple state lines before initiating court proceedings in a Louisiana, a state with no connection to Khalil’s life or his alleged “disruptive activities.” In most areas of U.S. law, this choice of venue would be improper. But the government had brought Khalil to U.S. immigration court, where traditional venue limitations do not apply.
In a recent article, Stacy Caplow and Maryellen Fullerton, both of Brooklyn Law School, use Khalil’s case to illustrate what they call “immigration venue exceptionalism,” a system in which the government alone controls where removal proceedings occur. Caplow and Fullerton argue that this unchecked authority allows the government to exploit geography to its advantage, selecting venues that are inconvenient for respondents and governed by immigration-unfriendly precedent. They contend that this strategic forum shopping undermines procedural fairness in immigration proceedings by denying noncitizens meaningful access to counsel, evidence, and community support.
Caplow and Fullerton center their examination of immigration venue exceptionalism on the story of Mahmoud Khalil. Khalil, a Palestinian and lawful permanent resident of the United States, began living in New York City in 2022. There he attended Columbia University and became a prominent figure in the “Gaza Solidarity Encampment,” a major protest demonstration on Columbia’s campus in April 2024.
Almost a year later, in March 2025, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents arrested Khalil without prior notice in his New York City apartment. ICE agents then transferred Khalil to detention centers located in multiple different states before moving him finally to Louisiana. Once there, federal officials initiated deportation proceedings to remove Khalil from the United States.
In these proceedings, immigration officials alleged that Khalil had engaged in activities that “endangered the foreign policy of the United States,” thus justifying his deportation. Although the officials did not give factual detail to this claim, Caplow and Fullerton infer that the alleged activities refer to Khalil’s participation in the 2024 protests on Columbia’s campus in New York. The government nevertheless insisted that his immigration court proceedings remain in Louisiana.
According to Caplow and Fullerton, this sequence demonstrates how the government can deliberately separate respondents from their lawyers, families, and communities while simultaneously securing review in a federal appellate circuit known for restrictive immigration jurisprudence. The Khalil case, they suggest, is not an anomaly but part of a broader pattern of strategic venue selection enabled by current immigration regulations.
Caplow and Fullerton situate their arguments about immigration venue practices against the backdrop of traditional venue doctrine in U.S. law. Historically, venue developed as a safeguard for defendants, ensuring that litigation occurred where parties resided or where underlying events took place. Both English common law and early American practice emphasized geographic fairness, witness accessibility, and community accountability.
Civil venue rules similarly evolved to prioritize defendant convenience and evidentiary efficiency, culminating in modern statutes that tie venue to residence or the locus of relevant conduct. In criminal law, the U.S. Constitution enshrines venue protections in two separate provisions, reflecting the gravity of subjecting individuals to prosecution far from home. For Caplow and Fullerton, these venue rules and practices collectively reflect a longstanding commitment in U.S. law to fairness and balance between litigants.
By contrast, the Immigration and Nationality Act contains no provisions on venue selection in immigration cases, leaving the issue to agency regulation. In deportation cases, the governing regulations provide that venue lies wherever the government files the charging documents. This regulatory scheme grants the U.S. Department of Homeland Security unfettered discretion to select any immigration court in the country, without regard to geographic connection or fairness.
Caplow and Fullerton maintain that this approach is fundamentally inconsistent with venue norms across the rest of the U.S. legal system. By ignoring geography, they reason, immigration venue ceases to function as a protective mechanism and instead becomes an instrument of prosecutorial power.
Caplow and Fullerton describe the consequences of this system as significant and multifaceted. At the immigration court level, empirical studies show that where a case is heard often matters as much as the facts or law governing the claim. Data from asylum adjudications, for example, reveal stark disparities between courts, with denial rates exceeding 80 or 90 percent in some venues, while remaining far lower in others. Caplow and Fullerton note that the Jena, Louisiana, immigration court—where Khalil’s case was assigned—has particularly high denial rates, underscoring how venue choice can effectively predetermine outcomes.
Venue selection also dictates which federal circuit’s precedent governs the case, both at the immigration court and on appeal. Immigration judges must apply the law of the circuit in which their court is located, and the Board of Immigration Appeals follows the same approach. Consequently, by choosing the immigration court venue, the government effectively chooses the substantive law that will apply.
Caplow and Fullerton detail how federal circuits diverge on critical immigration questions, including asylum eligibility, criminal deportability, and procedural rights. These divergences mean that similarly situated noncitizens may receive different outcomes depending solely on geography.
Caplow and Fullerton warn that the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2024 decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo—which overturned judicial deference to reasonable agency interpretations of statutes under Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council—will exacerbate these disparities in immigration court outcomes. Without Chevron’s moderating influence, federal circuits are now free to adopt independent interpretations of immigration statutes, increasing the likelihood of doctrinal fragmentation. According to Caplow and Fullerton, this development heightens the incentives for governmental forum shopping and magnifies the stakes of venue selection.
In addition, Caplow and Fullerton argue that the expansion of remote adjudication has further entrenched venue exceptionalism. Video and telephonic hearings now often involve judges, respondents, and counsel located in different states, complicating determinations of proper venue. For Caplow and Fullerton, remote hearings weaken the practical connection between proceedings and the respondent’s community, making geographic manipulation easier and less visible.
As a corrective, Caplow and Fullerton recommend recalibrating immigration venue norms so that they align with traditional venue principles. They propose that immigration court venue should presumptively lie where the respondent resides or where the alleged conduct occurred. When the government initiates proceedings elsewhere, motions to change venue should presumptively be granted absent compelling reasons to the contrary.
Applying this proposal to the Khalil case, Caplow and Fullerton conclude that venue should have been located in New York. Khalil’s residence, family ties, legal representation, and alleged conduct were all centered there, while Louisiana bore no connection to the case. The government’s insistence on keeping the Louisiana venue only exemplifies the systemic unfairness their proposal seeks to remedy, Caplow and Fullerton maintain.
They emphasize the urgent need to confront immigration venue exceptionalism before it becomes further entrenched. Without reform, unconstrained venue practices will continue to erode fairness, amplify disparities, and undermine confidence in immigration adjudication.
