Quantum Technology and Export Controls

Quantum technologies—advancements that exploit quantum mechanics for unprecedented computing, sensing, and communications—are quickly moving from the research lab into the realm of national security strategy. Because these technologies are dual-use, with applications that can advance civilian industries from medicine to automobiles while also offering significant enhancements to military capabilities, export controls have emerged as a main levers for managing who gets access to quantum technologies and on what terms. The United States has expanded its export restrictions on advanced quantum technologies in the name of national security, and China has responded by tightening its own rules on critical raw materials. Europe, caught between two powers, faces pressure to coordinate with the United States even as its authority over export controls remains divided across member states.

Much of the current debate is also framed through international trade law. The World Trade Organization, through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), generally prohibits arbitrary restrictions on trade. At the same time, the GATT allows for states to impose limits if and when their national security is at stake. The scope of these exceptions, then, becomes a point of divergence for scholars eager to regulate dual-use technologies or dedicated to broad trade of new technology.

Many scholars see these export controls as necessary to protect national security interests. From their perspective, aligning regulations across trusted partners contains adversaries and leaves room for collaboration. Others note, pragmatically, that licensing and targeted export restrictions are effective in managing the risks of technologies that could tip the balance in areas as diverse as cryptography and military sensing.

Other scholars are skeptical about the wisdom of this approach. They argue that locking down immature technologies risks slowing scientific progress and undermining international research partnerships. Some explain that broad claims of “national security” lack a solid foundation in international law outside of wartime contexts. Others emphasize that current trade law exceptions are written loosely, allowing states to impose controls before threats materialize, which creates a climate of regulatory uncertainty. From this standpoint, experts warn, export controls for quantum technologies not only raise legal questions but also threaten to fragment global research networks and weaken the global rules-based trading system.

Not all analysts are so critical. Some propose striking a balance, recommending that European countries build coalitions and invest in capacity before pursuing bloc-wide rules, use partnerships with Japan and South Korea to bolster bargaining power, and reduce dependence on U.S. frameworks. This perspective suggests how export controls are no longer just about denying access but also about shaping institutions and alliances for the future of quantum technology and all the civilian and military advancements it accompanies.

In this week’s Saturday Seminar brings together recent scholarship to highlight applications of export controls in the quantum sector, the legal justifications offered for them, and the risks they pose for innovation, collaboration, and the broader trading system.

• In an article in Law, Technology and Humans, the University of Amsterdam’s Anh Nguyen argues that regulators should cautiously approach quantum export controls to avoid stifling innovation. Nguyen notes that current regulatory proposals represent an unprecedented attempt to restrict a future technology, noting that performance thresholds set to trigger export controls exceed present capabilities. Nguyen argues that the technology’s dependence on specialized infrastructure makes it unusually vulnerable to regulatory chokepoints. She highlights the difficulty of applying conventional dual-use frameworks to quantum computing, noting that many components have both civilian and national security applications. Nguyen cautions that overbroad restrictions risk stifling academic collaboration and slowing innovation and calls for adaptive policies that balance national security concerns with open scientific exchange.
• In a forthcoming chapter, the University of Copenhagen’s Peter Davis and Timo Minssen, and the University of Cambridge’s Mateo Aboy, examine allied nations’ quantum computing export control policies. Davis, Minssen, and Aboy explain that recent U.S. rules go beyond traditional export control approaches by restricting exports of both quantum computers and technologies necessary to their development. The authors note that U.S. rules exempt allied nations with similar export control regimes. They highlight legal impediments to an E.U.-wide export control policy and survey member states’ controls, which largely mirror U.S. policy. The authors argue that aligning policy helps prevent technologies from reaching adversarial nations while allowing collaboration, but caution that national export control regimes may yet fragment, complicating future international collaboration.
• In their article, Amin Alavi and Yelena Guryanova of QuantumBasel and University of Basel examine how export restrictions are reshaping international trade. They argue that the United States has expanded the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) on national security grounds and used them to push allies toward matching controls, ultimately dividing the world into four trade groups. China, Alavi and Guryanova note, has responded by leveraging its dominance in raw materials and by invoking national security under its own export laws. The authors contend that reliance on GATT security exceptions risks weakening rules-based trade and further fragmenting global collaboration in quantum research and development.
• In his study in the European Integration Studies, János Székely of the Sapientia Hungarian University of Transylvania examines how export controls on transformative technologies operate as a form of economic coercion. Székely finds that U.S. restrictions aimed at limiting China’s access to artificial intelligence and quantum technology lack clear grounding in international law when invoked solely on national security grounds outside of armed conflict. Székely explains that such measures blur the boundary between defensive regulation and coercive trade policy, raising risks of escalation and double standards. Székely concludes that the extraterritorial reach of U.S. rules undermines the European Union’s technological sovereignty, requiring urgent reforms to its legal framework.
• In a World Trade Review article, Alexandr Svetlicinii and Xueji Su of the University of Macau examine how Article XXXI(b)(ii) of GATT’s “purpose test” fails to adequately govern emerging dual-use technologies like quantum computing. Analyzing the U.S.-China semiconductor dispute, the authors demonstrate that quantum technologies exemplify the regulatory challenges of dual-use items. Although quantum communications already see China matching or leading the United States, the nascent quantum industry lacks established supply chains and choke points, making it harder to regulate through traditional export controls. They argue that existing WTO security exceptions enable countries to impose anticipatory export controls on quantum technologies based on potential military applications, creating regulatory uncertainty that threatens the international collaboration essential to quantum research and development.
• In a Clingendael Institute report, Maaike Okano-Heijmans, Alexandre Gomes, and Brigitte Dekker of the Netherlands Institute of International Relations propose a pragmatic two-step approach for handling quantum technology export controls: EU technology holders should form coalitions before pursuing bloc-wide restrictions. By examining potential EU-U.S. cooperation models through 2030, they identify the EU’s fragmented export-control authority and inadequate multilateral regimes as key barriers. The authors recommend significant capacity-building investments, leveraging digital partnerships with Japan and South Korea to develop regulatory frameworks beyond U.S.-centric arrangements, and coordinating through the EU-U.S. Trade and Technology Council to strengthen Europe’s negotiating position. This coalition-building approach allows EU members to develop shared standards and bargaining power before attempting comprehensive bloc-wide regulations that may prove difficult to implement.