Beyond ESG

To save our planet, we must learn from the failures of ESG to devise stronger regulations.

One of the most tragic and consequential falsehoods repeatedly told by President Donald J. Trump and believed by many of his followers is that climate science is a hoax and that we need not pay attention to the problem.

Even President Trump, however, cannot fool Mother Nature.

Pretending that the laws of physics can be repealed by an executive order cannot change the reality that atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide, methane, and other greenhouse gases are increasing because of the burning of fossil fuels and the deforestation of land. President Trump’s second withdrawal from the Paris Agreement and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s revocation of the long-standing endangerment finding, which restates the scientific fact that greenhouse gases are in fact a pollutant, will surely kill and injure many people in the world now and in the future.

If this course of conduct is allowed to continue, and if the dreams of the 1992 Earth Summit and the 2015 Paris Agreement die, and if instead the planet is covered with fossil-fuel-powered data centers and we follow a business-as-usual course, then President Trump’s anti-climate actions will contribute to a massive number of future deaths and great economic damage caused by predictably more severe heatwaves, wildfires, droughts, floods, storm surges, and hurricanes. If corrective measures are not taken soon, a World Economic Forum report estimates that climate change may cause 14.5 million deaths and $12.5 trillion in economic losses worldwide by 2050.

One obvious solution is to “vote the climate” and turn away the politicians who deny climate science. This approach will require seeing through the political messaging funded by some wealthy business interests and businesspeople, especially in the fossil fuel and artificial intelligence industries, which favor inertia and inaction. The artificial intelligence boom depends at present on massive increases in electricity production by fossil fuels to power ever-expanding data centers.  These interests value their own profits over the predictable deaths, in the long run, of many millions of humans, as well as the erasing of almost a third other current existing species from the face of the Earth forever.

In addition to engaging in politics, though, what else can everyday people and businesses do? In recent work, mostly co-authored and co-edited with others, I have developed some ideas. One caution: These summaries and views are my own and not necessarily shared by my co-authors and co-editors.

A recent book, The Ethics of ESG: Critically Assessing the Environmental, Social and Governance Movement, which I co-edited with Valentina Gentile, Andreas Rasche, and Alan Strudler, collects various academic perspectives on a high-profile attempt to construct a non-governmental response to environmental and social problems. Our introduction to the book observes that “the bloom is off the rose of ESG.”

The Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) movement began in well-meaning but top-down fashion when the United Nations and large institutional investors came together to try to leverage business power to solve some of the most pressing collective action problems in the world, including the climate and biodiversity crisis. The idea was to create independent reporting standards for business institutions that would indicate performance on the criteria of “E” for the environment, “S” for social issues such as human rights, and “G” for good governance such as prevention of fraud and bribery.

It soon became clear, however, that developing voluntary standards to cover such broad categories was impossible or at least impracticable. Predictably, a host of competing standards emerged, and companies could pick and choose which one, if any, they wanted to adopt. The voluntary ESG movement also gave the impression that institutional investors and other business firms now really and truly cared about their environmental and social impacts as well as their bottom-line profits.

But that impression turned out to be an illusion. Proponents of ESG began to define the standards only in terms of traditional measures of financial materiality. In other words, ESG strategies and measurements would consider ESG factors relevant to corporate decision-making, but only with respect to their impact on the financial bottom-line of firms, and not the impact that firms had on the environment and wider society. The standards also suffered from vagueness and imprecision. Most critically, voluntary ESG standards lacked regulation.

From the start, it was also predictable that the ESG movement would run into political trouble. A backlash in the United States against environmental regulation targeted—and misinterpreted—ESG. In addition to President Trump, Florida Governor Ron DeSantis called for “crippling” ESG, and Vivek Ramaswamy, the recently defeated Republican candidate for governor of Ohio, lambasted ESG as a core part of the “social justice scam” of large institutional investors. Critics tarred ESG, along with its twin acronym DEI, standing for “diversity, equity, and inclusion,” as “woke capitalism.”

From my perspective, here are the lessons for the future of ESG.

First, voluntary regulation will not work. Business firms must instead partner with citizens and nonprofits to make laws that will mandate disclosure standards. The standards must also be legally enforceable, not only by governments but also through private lawsuits by citizens. Mandatory disclosure regulation should therefore specifically authorize standing for citizens or nongovernmental groups to sue and recover damages for violations.

Second, ESG as an acronym should probably be retired on grounds of overbreadth, vagueness, and political liability. The values that E, S, and G stand for, though, still matter. Priorities need to be decided concerning which specific values are most important, and then disclosure standards should be tailored to these values, such as climate, biodiversity, and human rights. Too many values and lax enforcement instead allow firms to game ESG by picking only those values they like—and can emphasize for public relations purposes—and ignore others.

Finally, limiting the reporting standards for ESG or other sustainability measures to whether an action will affect a company’s financial bottom line is a nonstarter. Win-win solutions—for example, to make money and save the climate—are possible, but they are not sufficient. There are inevitably trade-offs between “doing good” and “doing well.” We cannot make progress by pretending otherwise.

Fortunately, the European Union has been charting a path forward. Regulations such as the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive and the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive have been coming into force—though somewhat delayed and diluted because of the economic shocks delivered by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the United States and Israel’s war with Iran.

These regulations plug some holes in the ESG experiment. To begin with, they are mandatory as well as extraterritorial. Uniform legal standards work to counter the vagueness and too-many-standards problems of ESG. As importantly, the new EU laws adopt a “double materiality” approach that recognizes that sustainability impacts, including on the climate, cannot be reduced to financial terms. Firms must show they are acting as good citizens as well as profitable ones.

In a recent article, my Wharton School colleague Sandra G. Schafhäutle and I praise these EU regulations, but we lament that the EU did not take the step of connecting the reporting and due diligence directives on sustainability with corporate fiduciary duties, the legal duties of managers and directors to act in their corporation’s and shareholders’ best interests. Still, we argue that these mandatory disclosure standards are a potential means toward an eventual end of reforming fiduciary duties to move away from the increasingly intrusive “profit maximization paradigm” and toward including other important values, including climate and biodiversity preservation.

We discuss the drift in Delaware corporate law toward profit maximization as a governing paradigm, while recognizing that the business judgment rule and “permissive” fiduciary standards still provide corporate managers and officers some degree of discretion. More widely, our international survey finds that most if not all jurisdictions in the world are “permissive” in allowing climate and biodiversity impacts to be considered and given weight. Few jurisdictions, with a possible exception emerging in the Netherlands, however, impose “mandatory” fiduciary duties to consider climate and biodiversity issues, which means that almost all business firms in the world are free not to care about the climate or biodiversity at all, though many may pretend to care.

We identify another big problem too. The well-known separation of ownership and control incorporations between shareholders and managers has morphed into a new split between the fiduciary duties of investors, which sometimes mandate profit maximization, and those of top managers, which tend to remain more flexible in allowing consideration of other values. This bi-level fiduciary structure means that firms are forced to adopt the profit maximization paradigm in practice more often than the theories taught in business and law schools under the headings of the “business judgment rule” and the nice-sounding “duty of care” suggest. Corporate fiduciary duties allow and sometimes require profit maximization, which can rationalize the destruction of the climate and biodiversity. In this sense, we show that my previous rhetorical argument in a blog for Columbia Law School that there is a fiduciary duty to destroy the climate is true.

The solution is to reform fiduciary duties, which lie at the heart of corporate law. The profit maximization paradigm was imported into corporate law only relatively recently through the dominant influence of financial theories of the firm propounded by the old Chicago school of law and economics beginning in the 1980s and early 1990s. As I have shown in previous work, corporate law can, and should, be reformed to respect values other than those dictated by a narrow view of economics. As with any significant legal reform, changing corporate fiduciary to include a more expansive scope will not be easy, but is helpful that this change is only “radical’ in the original sense of returning to the roots of basic understandings of fiduciary duty.

As for other solutions, my chapter “Consumer Climate Contracts” in The Oxford Handbook on Climate Change and Private Law focuses on the role that individual consumers can play. The chapter picks up on a specific kind of “climate contract” that I recommended in an earlier article. Beyond their role as citizens, individuals can use their everyday power as consumers to act consistently with their values in making purchases—such as buying an electric rather than a fossil-fueled car. Consumer decisions can add up to pressure firms to meet aggregate consumer demands for more sustainable products and services, and consumers can concentrate this pressure by acting in concert.

For example, consumers can boycott certain firms, just as consumers boycotted Tesla after its owner, Elon Musk, reneged on his pro-climate pledges and joined the MAGA movement, or they may come together to “buycott” from firms that they like, such as Patagonia which now claims “the Earth” as its only shareholder in a hybrid business structure which combines a for-profit “perpetual purpose trust” with a majority nonprofit owner. Other options include joining class actions to redress environmentally related frauds and joining consumer cooperatives.

On climate co-ops, I am currently working on a chapter called “Climate Cooperatives: Community-Based Legal and Financial Infrastructure” with a Dutch co-author, Boudewijn de Bruin, that addresses this form of organization. We will argue that co-ops prove useful in sectors such as local renewable energy production, agriculture (especially in poor parts of the world), and climate finance.

The overall message from my recent research is an optimistic one. (I’ve been formally accused in the past of being a “legal optimist” and continue to plead guilty!) Although it is true that climate science presents a grim forecast, we have the technological means today to reverse course and to mitigate some of the harm already occurring. All we need is to find the political will and exercise sufficient legal creatively to grapple with this massive global collective action problem and avoid a climate apocalypse. Acting politically, including “voting the climate” and encouraging others to do so, is surely needed. My recent research shows also that there are other ways to be part of the solution: as business managers and investors, as employees, as consumers, and in new kinds of organizations such as climate cooperatives and other alternative business and nonprofit structures.

Eric W. Orts

Eric W. Orts is the Guardsmark Professor of Legal Studies and Business Ethics and Professor of Management at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania.