The Political Context of Rebuilding the Federal Regulatory Infrastructure

Politics will inevitably shape how U.S. regulatory agencies can be restructured for better performance in the future.

It is a truism that governmental functioning, its structure, its priority-setting, and its interactions are rooted in politics. Those politics find expression in part in legislation and in part in administrative choices, actions, and statements. There are tangible aspects of this phenomenon, such as the organizational structures of the agencies and offices, what powers they have, what resources and expertise, and who defers to whom. But politics also manifests in intangible ways, such as the mission and the culture of agencies and offices within them. That reality has important implications for any efforts to encourage preparations for rebuilding and replacing damaged and—in some cases—dysfunctional agencies and offices.

It would be difficult to make a reliable prediction of the United States’ political context next year, let alone three years from now. I will not try. But I will sketch a political context that appears to be possible and would also be supportive of the kind of infrastructure rebuilding that is the object of the series in The Regulatory Review in which this essay is a part.

A new administration, one that would be sympathetic to rebuilding better, will want to move on from the past. It will want to show that government can work. It will likely also exhibit populist aspects and want to speak directly to people. These characteristics will create some early political needs which, in turn, have design implications for rebuilding.

Meanwhile, any rebuilding effort must also contend with factors that discourage new arrangements. For one, just reproducing previous, now-shuttered, arrangements will seem like the path of least resistance. Existing bodies, after all, had gained some sort of general acceptance and seemed to work. Furthermore, the expertise needed for rebuilding these past bodies will be readily available in the form of individuals’ personal experience with those past arrangements.

Yet, in many cases, these past arrangements have had marked structural deficiencies, as is noted in other papers in this series. Also, too often people who have been affected by the work of regulatory bodies in the past have felt they were not listened to or even had been disrespected. For these reasons, one challenge will be to avoid slipping backward into old arrangements that did not work well while still keeping track of what has worked in the past.

Another, contrasting challenge will be to avoid over-elaboration: Policymakers face incentives to try to anticipate and meet every possible objection to their activity. Not only is this impossible, but too much complication and caution will be a burden that can impede action or divert attention. Such distractions will not sit well with an impatient public.

Any new administration will also want some early accomplishments. That will require working within what is left of the old infrastructure, which might complicate reorganization efforts and potentially discourage them. The administration will also need to demonstrate that it is responsive to people’s concerns by acting promptly while also listening to the concerns, needs, and wants of various constituencies. Needing to both act and listen will create tensions that could, without close attention, lead to harmful delays and incomplete reorganization. Furthermore, in the early stages, a new administration will also have limited resources with which to act. In 2025, the federal workforce shrank by over 10 percent, owing to the Trump Administration’s job cuts. With this in mind, there will be an early need for careful prioritization during a rebuild. At the same time a new administration will need to demonstrate that it cares that its actions be fair to those affected. It will have to be flexible without seeming wishy-washy.

The principal implication of these expectations is that those of us concerned with rebuilding should pay close attention to the rebuilding process, not just desired end-states. Indeed, some of the most important accomplishments of rebuilding should occur before the job is finished.

For instance, it will be important to find opportunities for early accomplishments, such as helping particular groups with disaster recovery or demonstrating success at protection against environmental or health threats.

In addition, decisionmakers must leverage state, local, and private capabilities, which may have suffered somewhat less damage during the drastic cuts to federal agencies. These non-federal capabilities offer opportunities for radical exploration of alternative approaches to performing or supplementing tasks that have been the province of federal agencies. In fact, some such efforts are already underway and others, half-shuttered, could be revived.

A successful rebuild will also require investments in human infrastructure. This process will entail starting early to recruit individuals with the necessary expertise and vision for the goals of a proposed rebuild. It will also include creating effective and proactive measures for listening to stakeholders, measures that do not solely rely on after-the-fact public comment mechanisms.

To rebuild effectively, policymakers will also have to identify efforts that will require new legislation and prepare the political ground for large legislative packages.

Underpinning all of these tasks must be the common value of fairness. Any sort of administrative rebuilding must make fairness an explicit aspect of proposals for new regulations and incentives.

It is vital that those engaged in this effort keep in mind that building something new out of the ashes is difficult. Within the process of rebuilding, there will be mistakes and misunderstandings. Voices will rise in opposition. Facing these obstacles will require acknowledgement and correction.

Furthermore, many deficiencies in the old bureaucracy that we hope to correct are failures to cope adequately with complexities in our contemporary world. Too many agencies operate in separate silos when the challenges stem from connections between different problems. Better approaches to synthesis are needed.

With complexity comes reduced predictability. What will be needed in restructured and better-connected agencies is a culture of adaptation. This culture will involve keeping track of conditions, learning from them, and possessing the flexibility to adjust when knowledge or circumstances change. A culture of adaptation must be strong enough to maintain short-term flexibility within agencies while also supporting their long-term stability. And it will be essential to communicate that culture within the political sphere and to the public.

To be forthright about mistakes and changes in understanding is difficult when one has responsibilities that affect many people, but it is essential in an adaptive culture and an essential aspect of communicating about adaptation—and consequently, crucial to the rebuilding mission.

Rebuilding cannot occur in a vacuum, devoid of attention to process considerations. It must take the political context surrounding risk regulation and the administrative state fully into account.

This essay is part of a series titled, “Rebuilding the U.S. Regulatory System.”