GRANDFATHERING AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF NEW SOURCE REVIEW

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INTRODUCTION

How should the law introduce a new, more stringent regulation that governs behavior that predates it? Should the law afford relief to actors that

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We are grateful to the following individuals for helpful discussions, suggestions, and comments on prior drafts: Ross Baldick, Vicki Been, Peter Carstensen, Oscar Chase, Michael Collins, Kevin Davis, Lee Fennell, William Fischel, Nicholas Georgakopoulos, Michael Gerrard, Michael Herz, Shi-Ling Hsu, Leandra Lederman, Daryl Levinson, Steven Shavell, Peter Strauss, Katrina Wyman, and Zivan Zahar. We also benefited from comments received at a presentation at the 2005 annual meeting of the American Law and Economics Association at New York University School of Law, at the 2005 annual meeting of the Canadian Law and Economics Association at the University of Toronto Faculty of Law, at the 2005 Tulane Law School Environmental Policy Conference, at the 2004 annual meeting of the Midwestern Law and Economics Association at the University of Iowa College of Law, at an environmental law workshop at the Georgetown Law Center, and at faculty workshops at Cornell Law School and Tulane Law School. Monica Emilienburg, Lauren Godshall, James Hobbs, Kevin Lynch, Evan Saucier, Matthew Stecher, Daniel Weick, and Margaret Welles provided excellent research assistance.
have been engaging in the behavior since before the new regulation’s enactment? If so, in what form? And for how long?

In this Article, we consider these questions in the context of environmental regulation in general and the Clean Air Act in particular. Almost forty years ago, under the 1970 amendments to the Clean Air Act, Congress decided to subject new sources of air pollution to stringent pollution control standards. It “grandfathered” preexisting sources, leaving them free of federal regulation. In the ensuing decade, however, statutory and regulatory development made clear that a “modification” of a grandfathered plant that increased the plant’s pollution emissions would subject it to the same federal standards applied to “new sources.” The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) determined on a case-by-case basis what constituted a modification, which triggered the new source standards, and what constituted “routine maintenance, repair, and replacement,” which did not.

In December 2002 and October 2003, the Bush Administration adopted regulatory revisions that significantly extended the grandfathering of old plants. One regulation allows plant owners more flexibility in determining the baselines against which changes in pollution emissions levels are measured. This change decreases the number of modifications that are deemed to result in increased pollution emissions levels and, thus, that are subject to the New Source Review (NSR) program. The other regulation provides a safe harbor for modifications and renovations of grandfathered plants that cost less than twenty percent of the replacement cost of a grandfathered unit. The Administration justified these regulations by noting that the uncertainty of the existing case-by-case standard discouraged owners from undertaking desirable plant renovations. The new regulations, the Administration declared, would resolve this uncertainty without impairing environmental quality.

Environmentalists, and some states, challenged the new regulations, arguing that they extend the lives of obsolescent plants that should be taken out of service. Most of the regulations’ provisions have survived judicial scrutiny. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit invalidated the twenty percent safe harbor. Even with respect to this invalidated regulation, however, the story continues. First, the Administration filed a certiorari petition, which the Supreme Court denied on April 30, 2007. Nonetheless, the EPA has indicated that in any event it may apply the safe harbor in its case-by-case analysis of whether to bring

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1 For a discussion of the history of “grandfather clauses” and “grandfathering” from their origins in the context of voting rights through their current usage in broad areas of law including environmental regulation, see Heidi Gorovitz Robertson, *If Your Grandfather Could Pollute, So Can You: Environmental “Grandfather Clauses” and Their Role in Environmental Equity*, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 131, 131–35 (1995).

2 New York v. EPA, 443 F.3d 880 (D.C. Cir. 2006).

enforcement actions, thus giving it de facto effect. And, on September 14, 2006, the EPA proposed a further set of regulations, making it easier for plants to modernize without meeting the new source standards.

In this Article, we present an economic analysis of the transition relief issue that the new regulations raise. We demonstrate that the new regulations are inefficient and would, contrary to the Administration's contention, worsen environmental quality. While certain transition relief may be appropriate in the context of environmental regulation, we argue that the relief should be limited in time. Moreover, because providing time-limited transition relief itself introduces the risk that recipients will seek to have that relief extended, we advocate that an appropriate system of time-limited relief should include disincentives to extensions.

The analysis here applies beyond the particular implications of the new regulatory revisions of grandfathering to new source review under the Clean Air Act generally. For example, in United States v. Duke Energy Corp., the Fourth Circuit concluded that a plant modification allowing the plant to operate more hours per day, thereby increasing its total yearly emissions, did not trigger new source review provided its hourly emissions rate did not increase. The Fourth Circuit's decision was at odds with the holding of the District of Columbia Circuit in New York v. EPA, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Duke Energy case to resolve the conflict. In the wake of the Court's grant of certiorari, the Seventh Circuit decided United States v. Cinergy Corp., aligning itself with the District of Columbia Circuit. The Supreme Court recently sided with the District of Columbia and Seventh Circuits, rebuffing the Fourth Circuit's attempt to extend grandfathering judicially. But this outcome might be short-lived. On May 8, 2007, the EPA proposed a rule under which new source review for power plants would be triggered only if a plant increased both its hourly emissions rate and its total yearly emissions.

The policy questions these cases raise are analogous to those raised by the recent regulatory revisions. As Judge Richard A. Posner, writing for the court in Cinergy Corp., observed, "Cinergy's interpretation would give the company an artificial incentive to renovate a plant and by so doing increase

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4 See infra note 164.
9 458 F.3d 705 (7th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2034 (2007).
10 Env'tl Def., 127 S. Ct. 1423.
the plant’s hours of operation, rather than to replace the plant.”

In reversing the Fourth Circuit’s decision, the Supreme Court removed that incentive and thus cabined somewhat the Clean Air Act’s grandfathering. Despite the Court’s holding, the Bush Administration has announced that it plans to continue revising the regulations so as to reduce the scope of new source review, thus further extending the Clean Air Act’s grandfathering.

Our analysis and argument here apply more broadly than to the case of air pollution regulation. The problem of whether and how to extend favorable treatment to existing sources is a recurring issue in environmental law. Our discussion applies wherever a new regulation precludes new entrants from engaging in a particular activity in which existing actors are already engaged. Thus, our analysis and argument also apply to the treatment of so-called “non-conforming uses”—land uses that predate zoning regulations that would now prohibit them—under zoning law.

This Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, we discuss the history of the Clean Air Act’s differential regulation of new and modified sources. We focus on the circumstances under which existing sources that modernize their operations are required to meet the new source standards. Our detailed account highlights an important distinction. Until the beginning of the current administration, the EPA invoked its regulatory authority to define as consistently as possible the nature of the grandfathering prescribed by Congress in 1970 and 1977. In contrast, the EPA under the Bush Administration has significantly expanded the scope of the grandfathering.

In Part II, we examine the likely effects of the new regulations on new investment in plants and on air quality. We identify serious flaws in the Administration’s argument that the expanded grandfathering will promote efficiency and modernization, and lead to better environmental quality. Both the theoretical analysis and the empirical evidence point in quite a different direction.

Part III considers the interactions between the new regulations and other regulatory standards under the Clean Air Act. We show that the laxer regulation of existing, dirty sources necessarily leads to more stringent regulation of new, cleaner sources, thereby increasing the overall cost of achieving a given level of environmental quality.

In Part IV, we analyze the expanded grandfathering of existing sources as a form of transition relief. The literature governing legal transitions suggests that transition relief is generally undesirable. The new regulations are unwarranted under this general presumption against transition relief. Moreover, to whatever extent transition relief may have been warranted under the original Clean Air Act, we argue that the new regulations exceed appropriate measures of transition relief.

12 458 F.3d at 709.
I. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY BACKGROUND

For more than three decades, the EPA sought to define a consistent understanding of the congressionally defined scope of grandfathering. Changes in administrations did not produce significant changes in policy. This approach came to an abrupt end in 2002, when the Bush Administration invoked its regulatory authority to significantly expand the scope of grandfathering, making it possible for existing sources to undertake considerable modernization without meeting the new source standards.

A. The 1970 and 1977 Amendments

The 1970 amendments to the Clean Air Act divide regulatory authority over stationary sources of pollution between state and federal governments. The federal government sets “standards of performance” for new stationary sources and modified existing sources; the state governments regulate existing, unmodified stationary sources.14 States must also ensure that the siting of new sources does not lead to a violation of the federally set national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS).15

Under the Clean Air Act, the EPA promulgates federal performance standards for stationary sources, “the construction or modification of which is commenced after the publication of regulations.”16 The Act defines “modification,” in turn, as “any physical change in, or change in the method of operation of, a stationary source which increases the amount of any air pollutant emitted by such source or which results in the emission of any air pollutant not previously emitted.”17 Under a literal reading, any such change resulting in an increase in emissions, however miniscule, would qualify the change as a “modification” and thus trigger the application of new source performance standards.

Commentators regularly note that Congress expected most existing sources to gradually phase out over the course of their ordinary economic lives or to upgrade and trigger the new source performance standards, leaving most major stationary sources subject to federal control.18 Although the

15 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a) (requiring states to provide for all control measures necessary to achieve NAAQS); id. § 7409(b) (defining primary NAAQS as standards “requisite to protect the public health” that incorporate “an adequate margin of safety,” and secondary NAAQS as “requisite to protect the public welfare”).
16 Id. § 7411(a)(2). Stationary source is defined as “any building structure, facility, or installation which emits or may emit any air pollutant.” Id. § 7411(a)(3).
17 Id. § 7411(a)(4).
18 E.g., BRUCE BIEWALD, DAVID WHITE, TIM WOOLF, FRANK ACKERMAN & WILLIAM MOOMAW, GRANDFATHERING AND ENVIRONMENTAL COMPARABILITY: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF AIR EMISSION REGULATIONS AND ELECTRICITY MARKET DISTORTIONS 2 (1998), available at http://www.synapse-energy.com/publications.htm (“Participants in the original [c]ongressional debates, and official reports from the 1970s and 1980s, make it clear that lower overall emissions were expected
legislative history from 1970 does not make explicit the assumption that old sources would inevitably phase out or upgrade, the legislative history of the Clean Air Act’s 1977 and 1990 amendments strongly suggests that Congress in 1970 expected grandfathering of these sources to be only temporary. In particular, legislators were aware that the expected useful economic life of power plants was thirty to forty years.

In 1977, Congress further entrenched the two-tiered approach to the regulation of new and existing sources through the passage of the Clean Air Act Amendments, which expanded the scope and stringency of the 1970 Act. The amendments established two programs, the Prevention of Sig-

...to result from gradual phase-in of new plants and new energy technologies. Unfortunately, it turns out that many old plants are remaining in service far longer than expected, causing an indefinite delay in the anticipated emissions reductions from facility retirement.”; Shi-Ling Hsu, Reducing Emissions from the Electricity Generation Industry: Can We Finally Do It?, 14 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 427, 435 (2001) (“[P]olicy has been developed with the assumption that thirty-year-old plants would be soon phased out of production.”); Deepa Varadarajan, Note, Billboards and Big Utilities: Borrowing Land Use Concepts to Regulate “Nonconforming” Sources Under the Clean Air Act, 112 YALE L.J. 2553, 2564 (2003) (“[L]egislators assumed that the natural turnover of power plants obviated the need for extensive old source regulation . . . .”); see also Larry Morandi, Winds of Change: Controlling Emissions of Pollutants by Power Generators Can Be Done, But There’s Lots of Disagreement on the Best Way, STATE LEGISLATURES, May 2003, at 26 (“Why the exemption for old facilities? The thinking at the time was that the older power plants would soon become obsolete and be replaced by newer, cleaner facilities.”). Generally, however, scholars cite one another for this proposition, rather than contemporaneous legislative documents. But see BIEWALD ET AL., supra, at 11 (“Thomas Jorling, Minority Counsel to the Public Works Committee that drafted the Clean Air Act, stated in interviews that the replacement of existing plants within normal operating lifetimes with newer ones that were subject to NSPS was implicit. David Hawkins, who was an influential attorney with the Natural Resources Defense Council who helped to shape the 1977 [Clean Air Act] Amendments[,] agreed that it was assumed that older plants would eventually be replaced.”).

19 Most of the expressly supportive legislative history is recent, as legislators proposing amendments to the Clean Air Act in the 1990s looked back to the Act’s passage. See, e.g., 136 CONG. REC. 36,007, 36,035 (1990) (Exhibit I submitted by George J. Mitchell) (“In 1970, the [Clean Air Act] required that new sources meet tight emissions standards. At that time, it was assumed that electrical utility units had an average lifetime of 30 years. But many utilities are now choosing to extend the life of their plants rather than meet the new source performance standards mandated under current law.”); id. at 6359, 6368 (1990) (statement of John H. Chafee) (“The rationale that is behind permitting these old plants to emit [at grandfathered emission capacity] is, first of all, they are inefficient, and at some point they are so inefficient they are going to be replaced.”). Legislative history regarding the New Source Review Program, established in 1977, contains an express reference to “[o]lder plants with relatively short-remaining useful lives.” H.R. REP. NO. 95-294, at 185–86 (1977). Note that a 1970 Senate Report contains a parallel but more circumscribed acknowledgement that at least some existing sources may have “short life expectancies.” S. REP. NO. 91-1196, at 19 (1970).

20 See Hsu, supra note 18, at 435; Varadarajan, supra note 18, at 2564 (quoting Hsu). Legislators were at least aware of such turnover. In the context of waivers for existing stationary sources emitting hazardous pollutants, the 1970 Senate Report states that “[t]he Secretary would be authorized therefore to waive the application of standards established under this section to such stationary sources which have short life expectancies after requiring the application of the maximum technology which could be applied to such facilities.” S. REP. NO. 91-1196, at 19. Legislators thus expected at least some existing sources to “die out” naturally.

Grandfathering and Environmental Regulation

Significant Deterioration (PSD) and Nonattainment New Source Review (nonattainment), collectively called the New Source Review (NSR) program. The NSR program requires new or modified sources to obtain preconstruction permits from the EPA or from a qualified state agency. The NSR permit requirements vary by region: new facilities in areas that have not yet achieved the NAAQS must meet the nonattainment requirements, whereas new facilities in areas that have achieved the NAAQS (or for which there is insufficient air-quality data) must meet the PSD requirements.

Under the PSD program, new or modified sources in areas with better ambient air quality than the NAAQS must meet a performance standard at least as stringent as the new source performance standards (NSPS): the best available control technology (BACT). The federal performance standards for PSD also apply only to new or modified sources, with "modified" defined in the same fashion as under NSPS. Existing sources remain under state control, and regulation of such sources is federally required only to the extent that it is necessary for states to achieve their applicable ambient air quality standards.

For areas that have not yet attained the NAAQS, the 1977 Amendments impose a parallel, but more rigorous, preconstruction review process. Under nonattainment review, new or modified sources—with "modified" having the same meaning as under NSPS—must meet a federal performance standard that is at least as stringent as any federal or state performance standard: the lowest achievable emission rate (LAER). Additionally, to obtain permits, new or modified sources in a region must procure offsets from existing sources in that region to ensure that the region's total emissions do not increase and that it can still achieve "reasonable further progress" toward the NAAQS.

24 Id. § 7475(a)(4) (BACT).
25 Id. § 7479(2)(C) ("modification" for PSD). Congress initially applied the PSD portion of the 1977 Amendments to new sources only, but quickly passed technical and conforming amendments to incorporate the NSPS definition of "modified" into the PSD program. Pub. L. No. 95–190, 91 Stat. 1393 (1977).
26 For PSD, this standard is the allowable NAAQS increment and visibility standards where applicable. 42 U.S.C. § 7475; see also id. § 7410(a)(2)(D) (state implementation plans in NSR regions).
27 See generally id. §§ 7501–15.
28 Id. § 7503(a)(2) (LAER); id. § 7501(4) ("modification" for nonattainment). These three federal performance standards represent varying degrees of stringency: NSPS takes into account cost considerations and energy requirements, id. § 7411(a)(1); BACT reflects "energy, environmental, and economic impacts" and emissions achievable through alternative fuel techniques, and can never exceed the level of emissions allowable under NSPS, id. § 7479(3); LAER represents the "most stringent emission limitation" contained in a state implementation plan or achievable in practice, id. § 7501(3).
29 Id. § 7503(a)(1)(A), (c)(1). Emissions increases must be offset by obtaining and registering emissions reductions.
With the exception of imposing some federal standards on old, unmodified sources in nonattainment areas, the 1977 Amendments generally extended the old-new, state-federal regulatory divide that so defined the 1970 Act. Legislative history and scholarly commentary suggest that Congress continued to make this distinction, relying on its expectation that old plants would gradually be phased out and replaced by lower-emitting facilities.

B. Early NSPS and PSD Regulation, 1970–1977

Regulators soon realized that the statutory definition of "modification" in section 111 was not self-evident. The EPA first proposed clarifying regulations in August 1971, and promulgated final rules in December of that year. The rules defined "modification" in much the same way the statute did—as "any physical change in, or change in the method of operation of, an affected facility which increases the amount of any air pollutant...emitted by such facility or which results in the emission of any air pollutant...not previously emitted." The rules provided that which changes qualified as "modifications" would be decided in case-by-case determinations made by the Administrator. The rules exempted several key activities, however, from the definition of modification: routine maintenance, repair, and replacement; an increase in production rate, if the increase did not exceed the "operating design capacity of the affected

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30 Under the NSR program, old, unmodified sources in nonattainment areas must meet emissions limits based on "reasonably available control technology" (RACT), the least stringent performance standard in the Act. Id. § 7502(c)(1).

31 See H.R. REP. NO. 95-294, at 185–86 (1977) (discussing some employment and economic benefits of exempting "[o]lder plants with relatively short-remaining useful lives," for example, that it would be more cost-effective and efficient for old plants to incorporate cleaner technologies when they upgrade, rather than forcing them to retrofit immediately). The emphasis that NSR places on proliferating cleaner technologies—on providing a guaranteed market for green vendors—supports the view that Congress assumed the gradual phaseout or modernization of old plants. See S. REP. No. 95-127, at 31 (1977); see also NAT'L ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN. (NAPA), A BREATH OF FRESH AIR: REVIVING THE NEW SOURCE REVIEW PROGRAM 14 (2003) [hereinafter NAPA] ("A vital aspect of this grandfather provision was the clear assumption of Congress that older, high-emitting sources would gradually be upgraded or phased out."). The discussion in supra notes 18 and 19 is equally applicable to the 1977 Amendments since Congress incorporated the same core legislative scheme. Indeed, the case for assumed turnover is stronger in 1977 than in 1970 given that the 1977 Amendments were passed, in part, to correct the evident failings of the 1970 Act to improve the nation's air quality and promote clean technologies. NAPA, supra, at 13. Gradual phaseout of old, high-emitting sources would seem essential to the successive cleaning of generations of sources and more rapid progress toward the NAAQS. See id. at 11–14.


facility”; an increase in hours of operation; and use of alternative fuel or raw material if the affected facility could accommodate such use.\textsuperscript{35}

These exceptions are inconsistent with the clear language of section 111, under which any increase in emissions, no matter how miniscule, triggers new source requirements.\textsuperscript{36} Nonetheless, the EPA viewed the routine maintenance exception as a “common-sense exclusion” from the statutory requirement; certainly the agency did not want to discourage basic maintenance.\textsuperscript{37}

Noting that confusion existed “as to what changes can be made to an existing source without the Administrator considering the source to have been modified,” the EPA proposed major changes to these regulations in October 1974,\textsuperscript{38} and promulgated final rules in December 1975.\textsuperscript{39} First, the rules distinguished the term “affected facility” from “stationary source” because the NSPS standards applied to individual processes and pieces of equipment rather than to entire sources.\textsuperscript{40} Construction of a new “affected facility” at an existing source would not subject the entire source, only the new facility, to NSPS.

Second, the rules established the predecessor to the “bubble concept,” whereby new emissions that were offset by control technology at the same source would not trigger NSPS.\textsuperscript{41} Existing sources could qualify for a “bubble” exception if, in undergoing a physical or operational change, “the total emission[s] rate of any pollutant [did] not increase[,] from all facilities within the stationary source,” for example, if the owner closed down another source within the plant.\textsuperscript{42} New construction, including new construction at existing sources, was ineligible for this “bubble” exception; however, because otherwise “large sources of air pollution could avoid the


\textsuperscript{37} The EPA described the routine maintenance exclusion as “common sense” in Requirements for Preparation, Adoption and Submittal of Implementation Plans; Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans; Standards of Performance for New Stationary Sources, 57 Fed. Reg. 32,314, 32,316 (July 21, 1992). Without the exclusion, the term “modification” could “encompass the most mundane activities at an industrial facility (even the repair or replacement of a single leaky pipe, or a change in the way the pipe is utilized).” Id.


\textsuperscript{40} 40 C.F.R. § 60.2(d)-(e), (aa) (1976).


\textsuperscript{42} Modification, Notification, and Reconstruction, 40 Fed. Reg. at 58,419; 40 C.F.R. § 60.14(d).
application of new source performance standards indefinitely" by continually replacing outdated facilities.43

Third, the rules defined an emissions increase as an increase in kilograms per hour. Thus, a source could increase its emissions by increasing its hours of operation without triggering the new source standards. The rules further provided two methods by which the Administrator could determine whether a physical or operational change resulted in an emissions increase: a factor-based test (with the factors being published from time to time by the EPA), or alternatively, a specific statistical method.44

Fourth, the rules expanded the list of activities exempt from the definition of “modification.” While tracking (with slightly altered wording) the exceptions listed in 1971, the 1975 regulations also excluded the following activities: an increase in production rates at existing facilities if that increase could be accomplished without a capital expenditure; an addition of a system “whose primary function is the reduction of air pollutants”; and a relocation or change in ownership.45

Finally, the rules declared that existing facilities undergoing reconstruction may become affected facilities—that is, trigger NSPS requirements—regardless of any change in emissions rates. The stated purpose of this rule was to “discourage the perpetuation of a facility, instead of replacing it at the end of its useful life with a newly constructed affected facility.”46 The regulation set a very high bar, however, for what constituted “reconstruction”: only if the fixed capital cost of the new components exceeded fifty percent of the fixed capital cost required to construct an entirely new comparable facility, and even then only if it was technologically and economically feasible for the post-replacement facility to comply with the applicable standard of performance.47 As with modification, the determination of reconstruction would be made by the Administrator on a case-by-case basis.48

These 1975 rules represented the first detailed attempt to define “modification” for NSPS. Yet even on their face, these regulations remained unclear. Indeed, the basic articulation of “modification” varied, without explanation, in consecutive pages of the 1975 Federal Register detailing these rules: on one page, it was defined as a physical or operational change that increases the amount of air pollutant emitted, whereas on the next it

44 Id. at 58,416, 58,418–19; 40 C.F.R. § 60.14.
47 Modification, Notification, and Reconstruction, 40 Fed. Reg. at 58,420; 40 C.F.R. § 60.15. The “reconstruction” exception applies to PSD but not to NSR. 40 C.F.R. § 60.15.
was defined as an increase in the emissions rate.\textsuperscript{49} The EPA’s regulations for PSD, issued the year before, compounded this confusion by defining “modification” as a physical or operational change increasing the emission rate of a pollutant and simultaneously declaring that the definition is meant “to be consistent with the definition used in [NSPS],”\textsuperscript{50} which is phrased in terms of increases in total emissions.

\section*{C. The NSR Program and Its Regulatory Off-Shoots, 1977–2001}

Since the passage of the NSR program in 1977, which incorporated the NSPS statutory definition of “modification,”\textsuperscript{51} the EPA has promulgated additional regulations and enforced the exceptions available to existing facilities undergoing physical or operational changes. Most of the relevant regulatory changes have occurred within the last ten years.

Pursuant to the 1977 Amendments, the EPA issued a new PSD rule in 1978 and a new nonattainment rule in 1979.\textsuperscript{52} In its PSD rule, the EPA defined “modification” as a physical or operational change that increased a source’s “potential to emit”—the first appearance of that phrase in the Clean Air Act regulations.\textsuperscript{53} In addition, the EPA limited preconstruction review only to those modifications deemed “major,” which the EPA defined as changes increasing emissions rates by either 100 or 250 tons per year, depending on the category of stationary source.\textsuperscript{54} As under NSPS, the EPA exempted “routine maintenance, repair, and replacement”\textsuperscript{55} and allowed for “netting” to offset emissions increases.\textsuperscript{56} The 1979 nonattainment rule largely paralleled this PSD rule.\textsuperscript{57}

Industry and environmental groups brought immediate challenges to the PSD rule. These challenges culminated in a lengthy District of Colum-

\textsuperscript{49} Compare id. at 58,418 (amount of pollutant), and Rules and Regulations, 36 Fed. Reg. 24,877 (Dec. 23, 1971), with Modification, Notification, and Reconstruction, 40 Fed. Reg. at 58,419 (emissions rate). In a recent case, the D.C. Circuit characterized these 1975 regulations as confused. See New York v. EPA, 413 F.3d 3, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“[N]either the 1975 regulation nor its preamble explained why EPA found it necessary to offer these two separate glosses on ‘modification.’”).


\textsuperscript{53} Prevention of Significant Air Quality Deterioration, 43 Fed. Reg. at 26,380, 26,403–04.

\textsuperscript{54} 40 C.F.R. §§ 51.24(b)(2), 52.21(b)(2) (1978).


\textsuperscript{56} Prevention of Significant Air Quality Deterioration, 43 Fed. Reg. at 26,388.

\textsuperscript{57} Emission Offset Interpretative Ruling, 44 Fed. Reg. at 3282.
bia Circuit opinion, *Alabama Power Co. v. Costle*. While the case concerned PSD, many of its holdings were equally applicable to nonattainment, given the regulatory overlap. The court in *Alabama Power* upheld many key provisions of PSD, including the bubble provisions. The court, however, invalidated the EPA’s limiting of major “modification” to only those sources emitting 100 or 250 tons per year on the grounds that the statutory definition of modification is “nowhere limited to physical changes exceeding a certain magnitude.” Any such limit, the court concluded, would contravene congressional intent to make grandfathering of old sources only temporary by giving old sources “a perpetual immunity” from PSD.

While invalidating the EPA’s threshold limit of modification, the court found that the EPA did have discretion to exempt activities “on grounds of de minimis or administrative necessity.” Finally, the court ruled that “potential to emit” could not mean uncontrolled emissions if pollution controls are installed and operative; the calculation had to include reductions attributable to pollution control technology. The court thus placed clear limits on the permissible scope of grandfathering.

After the *Alabama Power* decision, the EPA issued revised PSD and nonattainment rules—final NSR rules that remained in effect for over twenty years despite many court challenges and proposed revisions. In these 1980 rules, the EPA retained the phrase “major modification” from its 1978 rule, but defined “major” as any physical or operational change “that would result in a significant net emissions increase,” taking into account contemporaneous offsets. The EPA further decided that in determining whether a source has undergone a “modification,” the source’s “potential to emit” should be determined by reference to applicable pollution controls and any federally enforceable limits on hours, materials, and production. As under NSPS, the NSR rules exempted an increase in hours of operation or in production rates from the definition of physical or operational change.

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58 636 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
59 Id. at 401–03. The court differentiated its upholding of the PSD “bubble” rule from an earlier D.C. Circuit ruling that invalidated the NSPS “bubble” rule, ASARCO Inc. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 319 (D.C. Cir. 1978). One significant difference between the two programs was the definition of “source”: The NSPS rule allowed offsets from “any combination of facilities”—a “defect on which the ASARCO decision turned”—whereas the PSD rule did not. *Ala. Power*, 636 F.2d at 402.
60 Id. at 400.
61 Id. The court made clear, however, that the EPA’s discretion in this regard did not extend to exempting as de minimis all physical changes falling below a particular threshold. See id.
62 Id. at 353.
63 Requirements for Preparation, Adoption, and Submittal of Implementation Plans; Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans, 45 Fed. Reg. 52,676, 52,735 (Aug. 7, 1980).
64 Id.
65 Id. at 52,735–36.
Finally, the EPA retained the routine maintenance exclusion, an exclusion that had appeared in every iteration of the NSPS and NSR rules to date.\textsuperscript{66} Given the importance that the concept subsequently acquired, there was surprisingly little discussion about the routine maintenance exception in those early years.\textsuperscript{67} Even after the \textit{Alabama Power} court ruled that the EPA could limit the definition of modification only on grounds of de minimis increases or administrative necessity, the routine maintenance exclusion generated little comment. Indeed, the final NSR rules in 1980 adopted the routine maintenance exclusion exactly as proposed, without discussion, because the EPA received no significant comments on the proposal during the notice-and-comment period.\textsuperscript{68} Thus, in the final rules, the EPA did not elaborate on the term; the regulations did not explicitly define what activities would be deemed routine or minor and therefore avoid NSR requirements.\textsuperscript{69} Instead, not long after the establishment of the NSR program, the EPA began to make case-by-case determinations of whether changes mandated NSR review.\textsuperscript{70} The agency typically weighed multiple factors, such as the “nature, extent, purpose, frequency, and cost of the work,” to arrive “at a common-sense finding” about the appropriateness of applying NSR.\textsuperscript{71}

This ad hoc method of applying NSR to repair or facility maintenance projects frustrated both industry representatives and regulators, as did the EPA’s lack of clear definitions and standards for all issues involving major versus minor modifications.\textsuperscript{72} In response to these complaints, the EPA began an NSR reform effort in August 1992 by creating an advisory committee, comprised of representatives from the EPA, state environmental


\textsuperscript{67} See NAPA, \textit{supra} note 31, at 40.

\textsuperscript{68} Id. at 39.

\textsuperscript{69} Matthew C. Stephenson, \textit{A Tale of Two Theories: The Legal Basis for EPA’s Proposed Revision to the Routine Maintenance, Repair, and Replacement Exception, and the Implications for Administrative Law}, 33 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,789, 10,789 (2003) (“The scope of the [routine maintenance] exception is relatively narrow, its form is that of an open-ended, multi-factor standard, and its legal justification is not entirely clear . . . .”).


\textsuperscript{71} \textit{WEPCO}, 893 F.2d at 910 (quoting Memorandum from Don R. Clay, Acting Assistant Adm’r for Air and Radiation, U.S. EPA, to David A. Kee, Dir. of Air and Radiation Div., U.S. EPA Region V (Sept. 9, 1988)).

regulators, environmental groups, and industry representatives. From 1993 to 1996, the EPA held various “NSR simplification workshops,” initiated pilot programs, and received numerous comments from interested parties. A 1994 draft reform defined routine maintenance as “minor maintenance or repair of parts or components and the replacement of minor parts or components with identical or functionally equivalent items.” Industry, however, strongly opposed this proposed definition as being too limiting and discouraging “routine” change. In 1996, the EPA formulated an NSR simplification, proposing a revised determination of baseline emissions (actual and projected emissions), exclusions for “clean units” and “pollution control projects” (PCPs), and other changes to NSR applicability determinations. This proposed rule, which did not seek to clarify the meaning of the “routine maintenance” exception, was stalled for years.

In 1998, the agency renewed its reform efforts by again soliciting comments on its proposed reforms. Over the next two years, House and Senate members introduced reformed NSR standards, which subsequently failed in the face of industry opposition. After collecting and preparing responses to numerous comments, the EPA rewrote the entire NSR reform

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74 Id.
75 NAPA, supra note 31, at 40 (quoting EPA, New Source Review Reform 106--09 (1994) (preliminary staff draft)).
76 The EPA explained:

In general, [the] new “clean unit” exclusion will allow States to exclude from major NSR['] proposed changes to existing emissions units that have installed major BACT or LAER within the last 10 years . . . . Under this exclusion, sources can make any change to a qualifying unit so long as the change will not increase the unit’s emissions rate (measured in terms of the unit’s maximum hourly emissions . . . .). Specifically, changes which do not increase the unit’s hourly potential emissions would not be considered [] physical or operational change[s] and thus would not trigger major NSR.

78 The EPA explained:

The EPA proposes to adopt for all source categories a pollution control project exclusion from the definition of “physical or operational change” within the definition of major modification. This proposed exclusion will shield these projects from being considered “major modifications” and subject to major NSR. As proposed, the exclusion encompasses add-on controls, switches to less polluting fuels and pollution prevention projects[,] and is subject to one overarching safeguard[,] first applied in WEPCO: that the proposed pollution control project cannot result in an emissions increase that will cause or contribute to a violation of a NAAQS or PSD increment . . . . [For pollution prevention projects, the permitting authority must find that the project is environmentally beneficial before such projects may qualify as [] pollution control project[s].]

Id. at 38,261 (citations omitted). See generally id. at 38,260--63.
79 See generally id. at 38,250.
81 Hsu, supra note 18, at 436 & n.50 (referring to S. 2636, introduced in October 1998 by Sen. Leahy (D-VT); H.R. 2980, introduced in October 1999 by Rep. Allen (D-ME); and S. 2610, introduced in October 1998 by Sen. Lieberman); Varadarajan, supra note 18, at 2554.
proposal and presented it to stakeholders in February 1999.\footnote{Announcement of Public Meeting, New Source Review (NSR), 64 Fed. Reg. 3890, 3890 (Jan. 26, 1999).} Failing to develop a consensus, however, the EPA again solicited comments from stakeholders on potential NSR modifications that included an “opt-out” of NSR for the power-generating industry.\footnote{Michael Settineri, Reforming the New Source Review Program, 13 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 107, 111–12 (2001); see also Letter from John S. Seitz, Dir., Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards, to Participants (Dec. 20, 1999), available at http://www.epa.gov/ttn/nsr/gen/invite1.pdf.} But by May 2001, these reform efforts—lasting almost a decade—had not yet come to fruition.

Despite these failed reform efforts and ad hoc definitions of “major modification,” the EPA did not shy away from NSR enforcement cases. Large-scale and coordinated enforcement actions began in earnest in the late 1980s; the EPA brought actions against the wood products industry for their suspected failures to comply with NSR requirements after making significant changes in their operations.\footnote{See Thaddeus R. Lightfoot, Sand Through the Hourglass: PSD Enforcement and the Statute of Limitations, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 11,342, 11,342 (2002).} Throughout the 1990s, the EPA launched vigorous and successful enforcement initiatives against coal-fired power plants, petroleum refineries, chemical manufacturers, the pulp and paper industry, and the utility industry.\footnote{NAPA, supra note 31, at 42–43.}

One of the EPA’s early proceedings in the late 1980s culminated in a court decision that remains to date the most extensive judicial articulation of “major modification” for NSR: Wisconsin Electric Power Company v. Reilly (WEPCO), in which Wisconsin Electric Power Company challenged the EPA’s determination that it had undertaken a “major modification” without NSR approval.\footnote{893 F.2d 901, 904 (7th Cir. 1990); see also NAPA, supra note 31, at 42.} WEPCO claimed its renovations, including large-scale replacement of steel drums and air heaters, were exempt from NSR because they fit under the “routine maintenance, repair, and replacement” umbrella of activities.\footnote{WEPCO, 893 F.2d at 908.} The EPA countered that the project was too costly and extensive—an unprecedented “life extension” project—to qualify for the routine maintenance exemption.\footnote{Id. at 908–09, 911–12. The project cost at least $70.5 million, had never before occurred at the facility, and was of the sort that “would normally occur only once or twice during a unit’s expected life cycle.” Id. at 911–12; see also Inho Choi, Is the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s Revised New Source Review Rule Moving in the Right Direction?: A Deepened New Source Bias, and the Need for Pursuing Sustainable Energy Development in Air Pollution Control Law, 35 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,316, 10,321 (2005).} The Seventh Circuit ultimately upheld the legitimacy of the EPA’s narrow interpretation of “routine maintenance,” under which the EPA principally weighed four factors—the nature and extent, purpose, frequency, and cost of the project—to determine eligi-
bility for the exception on a case-by-case basis. The court reasoned that any broader definition—one that would include costly and sizeable "life-extension" projects—would "open vistas of indefinite immunity from the provisions of NSPS and PSD" for existing plants and "might upset the economic-environmental balance [of the Clean Air Act] in unintended ways." This decision bolstered the EPA's enforcement efforts against industries undergoing "major modifications" without obtaining NSR preconstruction permits.

After the EPA's early successes in proceedings against WEPCO and the wood products industry, the EPA began evaluating entire industry sectors and issuing "Sector Notebooks" to provide officials with comprehensive environmental profiles of industrial operations and emissions. Armed with this new information, in 1997 the agency began a three-pronged attack on the pulp and paper industry, the petroleum refining industry, and the electric utility industry. Data collected on these industries indicated that numerous facilities had probably been making major modifications to increase production without first undergoing NSR review; local and state en-


89 *WEPCO*, 893 F.2d at 909. The WEPCO case also addressed the EPA's determination of whether a plant's potential or projected emissions levels should be used to decide whether a physical or operational change produces significant increases in net emissions and therefore triggers NSR. Whereas actual-to-potential estimates assume maximum or continuous operation of the plant except as limited by permit, actual-to-projected-actual estimates assume ordinary operation—that the plant will operate at "present hours and conditions." *Id.* at 918 n.14. The WEPCO court rejected the EPA's actual-to-potential test in favor of an actual-to-projected-actual test for "like-kind equipment replacements" of the sort that WEPCO had performed. The EPA formalized the court's ruling in its 1992 rulemaking by allowing electric utility steam generating units to employ this actual-to-projected-actual test. 40 C.F.R. § 51.165 (1992). See also *NAPA*, supra note 31, at 38.


91 See, e.g., United States v. La.-Pac. Corp., 682 F. Supp. 1141, 1162–63 (D. Colo. 1988) (holding that defendant corporation should have obtained PSD permits before constructing two new wood products plants).

92 *NAPA*, supra note 31, at 42.

93 Armstrong, *supra* note 72, at 203–04.
environmental agencies had received surprisingly few NSR applications despite industry growth and surges in production.94

This initiative employed a narrow interpretation of the term "major modification," as delineated in part in the EPA’s 1998 NSR guidance.95 The EPA applied the four-factor WEPCO test strictly to find that many industry projects labeled as “routine maintenance” were far from routine; they were often too extensive, too costly (and charged as capital expenditures, not as part of the maintenance budget), and too infrequently performed at the specific unit to qualify for the exclusion.96 Many such projects were large-scale “life-extension” projects similar to WEPCO’s project; others were de novo construction of entire units; still others were “reliability projects,” which the EPA treated as “major modifications” even if the emis-

94 Id. at 204. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO), CLEAN AIR ACT: NEW SOURCE REVIEW REVISIONS COULD AFFECT UTILITY ENFORCEMENT CASES AND PUBLIC ACCESS TO EMISSIONS DATA 10 (2003) [hereinafter GAO REPORT, UTILITY ENFORCEMENT]; NAPA, supra note 31, at 42.

95 Memorandum from Eric V. Schaeffer, Dir., Office of Regulatory Enforcement, Guidance on Appropriate Injunctive Relief for Violations of Major Source Review Requirements, at 5–6 (Nov. 17, 1998), available at http://www.epa.gov/Region7/programs/air/nstr/nstrmemos/nsguida.pdf; see also Choi, supra note 87, at 10,326. The memorandum listed two situations in which NSR requirements were triggered, both involving potential emissions in excess of major source threshold or permit levels. See Memorandum from Eric V. Schaeffer, supra, at 3.

96 See David M. Friedland & Laura K. McAfee, U.S. v. Ohio Edison and U.S. v. Duke Energy: Conflicting Interpretations of “Routine Repair” Defense 4–6 (Sept. 5, 2003), http://www.bdlaw.com/assets/attachments/73.pdf; NAPA, supra note 31, at 43. In addition to narrowing the “routine maintenance” exemption, the EPA also seemed to be narrowing the alternative fuels exemption. See Armstrong, supra note 72, at 204. Regarding the cost factor of the “routine maintenance” analysis, the EPA typically examines the relative costs of improvements, not the absolute costs. Friedland & McAfee, supra, at 6. Other factors the EPA considers include whether the work is performed by outside contractors or by in-house maintenance staff and whether the expenses are charged as capital expenses or as part of the operation and maintenance budget. United States v. Ohio Edison, 276 F. Supp. 2d 829, 858–59 (S.D. Ohio 2003); Friedland & McAfee, supra, at 5. The scope of the “frequency” factor—whether “routine” should be defined relative to the particular unit or to all sources within the relevant industry—is under debate. Compare Requirements for Preparation, Adoption and Submittal of Implementation Plans; Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans; Standards of Performance for New Stationary Sources, 57 Fed. Reg. 32,314, 32,326 (July 21, 1992) (the WEPCO rule, seemingly favoring industry-wide approach for electrical steam generating units), and United States v. Duke Energy Corp, 278 F. Supp. 2d 619, 630 n.8 (M.D.N.C. 2003) (rejecting the EPA’s unit-specific approach as inconsistent with congressional intent and prior EPA interpretations), aff’d, 411 F.3d 539 (4th Cir. 2005), rev’d, 127 S. Ct. 1423 (2007), with Ohio Edison, 276 F. Supp. 2d at 861 (upholding the EPA’s unit-specific approach), and United States v. So. Ind. Gas & Elec. Co. (SIGECO), 245 F. Supp. 2d 994, 1007–10 (S.D. Ind. 2003) (same), and FRANCIS X. LYONS, REG’L ADMIN., EPA, DETROIT EDISON APPLICABILITY DETERMINATION DETAILED ANALYSIS 2 (May 23, 2000), available at http://www.epa.gov/region07/programs/air/nstr/nstrmemos/detedisn.pdf (defining “routine” relative to the particular unit), and In re Tenn. Valley Auth., 9 E.A.D. 357, 393–94 (U.S. EPA Envl. App. Bd. Sept 15, 2000), available at http://www.epa.gov/eab/dsk11/tnv.pdf (adopting unit-specific definition of “routine,” though this decision was later voided by the Eleventh Circuit for lack of jurisdiction, Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Whitman, 336 F.3d 1236, 1239 (11th Cir. 2003)).
sions increase was caused by increasing hours of operation rather than by increasing emissions rates.\footnote{97}

In summary, frustrated by its own inability to produce the much-sought-after NSR reform through notice-and-comment rulemaking, the agency clarified the meaning of “major modification” through the exercise of its enforcement authority.\footnote{98} The initiative was successful for the EPA because it led to “unprecedented settlements in terms of scope and penalties.”\footnote{99} The EPA secured large settlements from a number of different industries, beginning with over $15 million in civil penalties and over $90 million in pollution-control installation costs from Georgia-Pacific and Louisiana-Pacific for violations by their pulp and paper production facilities.\footnote{100} Between 2000 and 2001, the EPA reached settlements with four petroleum companies involving twenty-seven refineries.\footnote{101} One settlement in 2004 cost the settling refinery an estimated $323 million in installation and mitigation costs and civil penalties.\footnote{102} Within the power-generating utility industry, the EPA reached a number of sizeable settlements after the federal government commenced actions against nine electric utility companies in


98 Armstrong, \textit{supra} note 72, at 205 (“The NSR enforcement initiative has taken on the look of a surrogate for those regulatory initiatives that have stalled and may ultimately fail.”); Kevin A. Gaynor & Benjamin S. Lippard, \textit{Environmental Enforcement: Industry Should Not be Complacent}, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,488, 10,488 (2002) (“It is a fair statement that under EPA’s legal theories, every utility in the country has been violating the new source review requirements since their inception in 1978.”); Varadarajan, \textit{supra} note 18, at 2581.


100 See Armstrong, \textit{supra} note 72, at 203 (noting that the EPA fined Georgia-Pacific $4.5 million and Louisiana-Pacific $11 million, for a total of $15 million in penalties); NAPA, \textit{supra} note 31, at 170–71, 179 (noting that in 1993, Louisiana-Pacific agreed to pay $11 million in civil penalties and install $70 million in new pollution control equipment; in 1996, Georgia-Pacific agreed to pay $6 million in penalties and install $25 million in control equipment; and in 2000 and 2002, the EPA settled with two other wood products companies, Wilaemette and Boise Cascade, for a total of approximately $15 million in civil penalties and $99 million in control costs).

101 The four companies are Koch, BP-Amoco, Motiva/Equilon/Shell, and Marathon Ashland Petroleum. EPA, 90-DAY REVIEW, \textit{supra} note 97, at 30. For details on the civil penalties and control costs imposed, see NAPA, \textit{supra} note 31, at 179.

102 This settlement was with Citgo Petroleum. \textit{See} Choi, \textit{supra} note 87, at 10,327 n.103.
November 1999. The EPA already reached final agreements with six utility companies and “agreements in principle” with two others.

The targeted industries viewed the EPA’s actions “as a frontal assault on selected utilities in order to advance a radical and retroactive interpretation of the New Source Review (NSR) program of the Clean Air Act.” In 2002, however, the Bush Administration’s Department of Justice published an NSR report characterizing the EPA’s enforcement initiative, in particular...
its interpretation of the routine maintenance exception, as legally sound and "reasonable" in light of the CAA and its implementing regulations.106

D. Recent Regulation, 2001–Present

In May 2001—with the NSR reform attempts having lasted almost a decade, yet still incomplete—the Vice President’s National Energy Policy Development Group issued its proposed national energy policy.107 This proposal included a recommendation that the EPA report to the President on the NSR and NSPS programs’ effects on investment, energy efficiency, and pollution reduction.108 In response, the EPA released an “NSR 90-Day Background Paper” in June 2001 and solicited public input.109

A year later, the EPA released its final report, “New Source Review: Report to the President.” The Report summarized the information the EPA received from the public and concluded that while NSR did not significantly hinder investment in new power plants and industrial facilities,110 it did discourage energy efficiency projects at already-existing facilities.111 The EPA recommended adding “clarity and certainty” to the scope of the routine maintenance exclusion so as to “reduce[e] the unintended consequences of discouraging worthwhile projects that are in fact outside the


108 Id. at 7–14; GAO REPORT, UTILITY ENFORCEMENT, supra note 94, at 12.

109 EPA, 90-DAY REVIEW, supra note 97. The EPA followed through by holding four public hearings, hosting individual meetings, and reviewing over 130,000 comments from private citizens, environmental groups, state officials, and industry representatives. EPA, NEW SOURCE REVIEW REPORT, supra note 97, at 2–3.

110 EPA, NEW SOURCE REVIEW REPORT, supra note 97, at 5–8 (“[A]s a general matter, available information indicates that NSR typically does not represent a significant barrier to the construction of new electricity plants [or of new refinery plants].”). The EPA cited substantial investment in new plants and refineries as evidence that NSR does not obstruct investment. The recent decline in investment in new greenfield refineries is not attributable to NSR, the EPA concluded, but rather to economic and environmental restrictions wholly unrelated to NSR. Id. at 1, 6, 8.

111 Id. at 14–17. The EPA based its conclusions solely on the large volume of anecdotal evidence it received from industry sources, id. at 11, because the agency had no comprehensive data on projects that failed to go through on account of NSR. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO), RPT. NO. GAO-03-947, CLEAN AIR ACT: EPA SHOULD USE AVAILABLE DATA TO MONITOR THE EFFECTS OF ITS REVISIONS TO THE NEW SOURCE REVIEW PROGRAM 4 (2003) [hereinafter GAO REPORT, DATA]. For more background on these investment conclusions, see EPA, 90-DAY REVIEW, supra note 97, at 18 (discussing the difference between retrofitting old plants, which can be technically problematic and expensive, and incorporating new pollution technology into new plants, an easier and cheaper process occurring during the design phase). In this 90-Day Review Report, the EPA suggested that most declines in new construction could be explained by non-NSR factors, for example, the high cost of natural gas and investment uncertainty in the electrical utilities market stemming from “deregulation and the emergence of non-utilities [in electric generation].” Id. at 14, 24.
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scope of NSR”—namely, projects that increase reliability, safety, and efficiency without actually increasing net emissions.\textsuperscript{112}

Shortly after completing this report, the EPA issued its first of two final rules, aimed at “provid[ing] regulatory flexibility to industrial facilities.”\textsuperscript{113} This rule, published in December 2002, modifies the NSR program in four principal areas: determination of baselines, plantwide applicability limits (PALs), standards for “Clean Units,” and pollution control projects (PCPs).\textsuperscript{114} These changes were intended to “reduce burden, maximize operating flexibility, improve environmental quality, provide additional certainty[,] and promote administrative efficiency.”\textsuperscript{115} The second rule, published in October 2003, significantly revises the “routine maintenance, repair, and replacement” regulatory provision by essentially exempting from new source review changes that cost twenty percent or less of the replacement value of the unit being maintained, repaired, or replaced, even if they result in a significant net increase in emissions.\textsuperscript{116} With this second rule, the EPA aimed to add the “clarity and certainty” evidently lacking from its case-by-case four-factor approach to the routine maintenance exclusions.\textsuperscript{117} With both rules, the EPA claimed that it was attempting to turn a thirty-year record of case-by-case determinations and vague legislative guidance into clear regulations.

1. The First Rule: NSR Improvement.—The first rule changes the baselines for both actual and future emissions. These baselines are used to determine if a physical or operational change “result[s] in . . . a significant net emissions increase”\textsuperscript{118} and therefore mandates NSR review. For deter-

\textsuperscript{112} EPA, NEW SOURCE REVIEW REPORT, supra note 97, at 11, 21, 32.

\textsuperscript{113} GAO REPORT, DATA, supra note 111, at 8.


\textsuperscript{115} EPA, PSD & NSR Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. at 80,189. The changes were first proposed, in a slightly different form, in the 1996 NSR Simplification Proposal. See Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) and Nonattainment New Source Review (NSR), 61 Fed. Reg. 38,250 (July 23, 1996). The 2002 rules differ from the 1996 proposals in several ways, including: an expanded list of eligible PCPs; elimination of the “primary purpose” test for PCPs, by which a project could only qualify as a PCP if its primary function was to reduce pollution; a slight change in clean unit eligibility criteria; and an extension of clean unit status from five to ten years for all clean units, including those that qualify through functional equivalence to BACT or LAER standards. Compare EPA, PSD & NSR Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. at 80,232–33, with Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) and Nonattainment New Source Review (NSR), 61 Fed. Reg. 38,260–61; see also Choi, supra note 87, at 10,332–33.


\textsuperscript{117} Id.

\textsuperscript{118} Requirements for Preparation, Adoption, and Submittal of Implementation Plans; Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans, 45 Fed. Reg. 52,676 (Aug. 7, 1980); 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(2)(i) (1980).
mining baseline actual emissions, the regulation now allows stationary sources to choose any consecutive twenty-four month period from the ten years immediately preceding the proposed modification. Under the previous rule, sources were required to base their pre-change actual emissions on their actual emissions from the consecutive twenty-four months immediately preceding the proposed modification. The EPA claimed that the ten-year as opposed to two-year look-back was more representative of a plant's business cycle.

For determining future emissions, the new rule allows a source to estimate its emissions based on projected capacity and usage, historic trends and emissions from the unit prior to the modification, and other factors—an "actual-to-projected-actual" test. Sources can exclude from this calculus increased emissions owing to growth in market demand (the "demand growth exclusion"). Under the previous rule, which had applied to all but

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119 EPA, PSD & NSR Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. at 80,198. Note, however, that electrical utility steam-generating units will still use their current method of calculating baseline actual emissions, which is based on average annual emissions from any consecutive twenty-four month period from the five years immediately preceding the proposed modification. Id. at 80,198; see also Requirements for Prepartion, Adoption, and Submittal of Implementation Plans; Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans; Standards of Performance for New Stationary Source, 57 Fed. Reg. 32,314 (July 21, 1992).

120 40 C.F.R. §§ 52.21(b)(21)(ii), 51.165(a)(1)(xii), 51.166(b)(21) (1980). Note, however, that under the old rule sources could base their actual emissions on a different twenty-four month time period if they could show that it was more representative of normal operations. Id. at § 51.21(b)(21)(ii); see also Choi, supra note 87, at 10,322.


122 Id. at 80,196-99. This "actual-to-projected-actual" calculation has applied to electrical utility steam-generating units since the WEPCO rulemaking, Requirements for Prepartion, Adoption, and Submittal of Implementation Plans; Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans; Standards of Performance for New Stationary Source, 57 Fed. Reg. at 32,314. See supra note 89. With its December 2002 rule, the EPA simply extended this method to non-utility units. See Robert J. Martineau, Jr., & Michael K. Stagg, New Source Review Reform: A New Year’s Eve to Remember, 18 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 3, 4 (2004). Some commentators suggest that this expansion of coverage will have little real effect given the current industry-wide use of potential-to-emit (PTE) limits; in effect, most states already use some form of the actual-to-actual test in assessing whether emissions increases will be significant. See David A. Golden, The Need to Reform NSR Reform, 12 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 170, 173-74 (1998); see also EPA, 90-DAY REVIEW, supra note 97, at 6-7 (discussing PTE limits, whereby a modified source agrees in its NSR or PSD permit or through incorporation into the EPA-approved state incorporation plan to limit its potential to emit, for example by installing pollution controls or by restricting hours of operation).

123 EPA, PSD & NSR Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. at 80,202-03. This demand growth exclusion has also applied to electrical utility steam-generating units since the 1992 WEPCO rulemaking, Requirements for Prepartion, Adoption, and Submittal of Implementation Plans; Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans; Standards of Performance for New Stationary Source, 57 Fed. Reg. at 32,314. Note that in 1998 the EPA had considered abolishing the exclusion, which then only applied to electrical steam-generating units, given the difficulty of differentiating increases owing to demand growth and increases owing to physical or operational change. EPA Notice of Availability, 63 Fed. Reg. 39,857, 39,860 (July 24, 1998). The EPA has not only retained the exclusion for electric-generation units, but has extended the exclusion to all other industries. See Choi, supra note 87, at 10,322-23. The D.C. Circuit found the EPA's change in position—from expressing "provisional dissatisfaction" in 1998 to fully
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electrical utility steam-generating units, sources estimated future emissions using an “actual-to-potential” test that assumed continuous operation of the source except as limited by permit; sources could not include any limiting factors that were not federally enforceable, such as historic and usage trends, nor could they exclude growth in market demand.124

These new baseline rule thus allow sources to choose an actual emissions figure that is relatively high—the highest of the previous ten years, even if it is aberrational—and to project a future emissions rate that is relatively low, incorporating all sorts of voluntary emissions limits and excluding market growth. This calculation makes it less likely that a plant’s modernization will be found to result in increased emissions. Furthermore, a source that believes its calculation yields “no reasonable probability” of a significant net emissions increase need not produce or maintain any records for the EPA—not even the very records upon which it bases its determination of “no reasonable probability.”125

The regulation also institutes PALs, PCPs, and clean units. Plant-wide applicability limitations (PALs) are a voluntary option for stationary sources by which the sources adopt ceilings or caps on emissions levels on a plant-wide basis.126 PALs then allow for a stationary source to make modifications and changes without triggering NSR regulations so long as the emissions remain below the established PAL for each pollutant.127 To calculate the PAL, the source selects its actual emissions from any consecutive twenty-four month period from the prior ten years—even when emissions were highest—and adds to that level any permissible de minimis increase.128 In effect, then, a source may use comparatively old emissions embracing and extending the exclusion in 2002—to be legally irrelevant, and upheld the exclusion as consistent with the Clean Air Act and administrative law principles. New York v. EPA, 413 F.3d 3, 31–33 (D.C. Cir. 2005).

124 Requirements for Preparation, Adoption, and Submittal of Implementation Plans; Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans, 45 Fed. Reg. 52,676 (Aug. 7, 1980). Federal courts had upheld the EPA’s use of the actual-to-potential test as it applied to all but electrical utility steam-generating units. See, e.g., Puerto Rican Cement Co. v. EPA, 889 F.2d 292, 296–97 (1st Cir. 1989) (upholding the EPA’s determination that factory renovations lowering hourly emissions rate nonetheless caused an “increase” in emissions because of significantly higher production levels). The regulatory exclusion for increases in hours of operation or production rate still applied—but only when unaccompanied by construction or modification. See 40 C.F.R. § 60.14(e) (1988) (NSPS program); id. § 52.21(b)(2)(iii) (PSD program).

125 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(r)(6).

126 EPA, PSD & NSR Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. at 80,189. To the extent that PALs operate on a plant-wide basis, they are analogous to the EPA’s “bubble” program, under which the EPA determines compliance with emissions requirements on a plant-wide, and not an individual source, basis. See Nathaniel Lord Martin, Note, The Reform of New Source Review: Toward a More Balanced Approach, 23 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 351, 369 (2004).


128 Id. at 80,208.
reductions to offset emissions increases in the near term. For example, a source that had high emissions levels a decade ago and had since reduced emissions could use those higher levels to establish a high PAL; the source could then undergo modifications that significantly increase emissions for that pollutant without triggering NSR. The cap lasts ten years and automatically renews at the same level if the source is emitting at eighty percent or higher of its PAL, in effect rewarding sources that have not reduced their emissions by much over their ten-year grace period.

Pollution control projects (PCPs) are similar voluntary programs that allow for NSR-avoidance. A PCP is any project or set of practices that results in "net overall environmental benefits," including projects that reduce the emissions rate of one pollutant while increasing, but to a lesser extent, the emissions rate of a different "collateral" pollutant. Existing sources can install approved PCPs without triggering NSR review, even if the installation would otherwise constitute a "major modification" because of an increase in emissions of a pollutant.

Clean units, in turn, may undergo certain modifications or changes without triggering further NSR review so long as their clean unit technology is maintained. The regulations define a "clean unit" as any unit that uses state-of-the-art pollution controls, meaning it either obtained a BACT or LAER permit within the last ten years or achieved emissions levels demonstrably comparable to BACT or LAER.

The rule prompted a quick negative response. Nine northeastern states immediately filed suit against the EPA, claiming the EPA's rulemaking—in particular the exemptions for clean units and the new method of baseline emissions calculations—exceeded the EPA's authority under the Clean Air Act.

As a press release from the Attorney General of New York noted,

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130 See id. at 657–58.
131 The PAL may be renewed at a lower level if the source is emitting below eighty percent of its cap. EPA, PSD & NSR Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. at 80,209–10, 80,216, 80,219–20; see also Hirsch, supra note 129, at 652 n.323 ("This [renewal] arrangement... give[s] participating facilities a perverse incentive not to reduce their actual emissions by more than 20% below the original PAL level," or, "[s]tated differently,... dissuades sources from reducing their emissions by more than 2% per year (on average) over the ten years of their permit term.").
132 EPA, PSD & NSR Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. at 80,232. Note that non-air pollution impacts will not be included in the "environmentally beneficial" calculation. Id. at 80,234.
133 Id. at 80,189.
134 Id. at 80,190, 80,223–29.
135 Boyd, supra note 114, at 401 n.6 (citing Katherine Q. Seeve, Nine Northeastern States File Suit over New Rules on Pollution, N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 2003, at A1); Press Release, Office of N.Y. State Att'y Gen. Eliot Spitzer, Nine States Sue Bush Administration for Gutting Key Component of Clean Air Act (Dec. 21, 2002), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002dec/dec31b_02.html ("The Attorneys General believe that these changes are so sweeping and damaging that the Environmental Protection Agency can not make them without Congressional approval. The rollbacks violate both the Clean
"[t]he Clean Air Act was initially adopted by Congress to improve air quality. There is no evidence from the EPA that air quality will improve as a result of the NSR changes and significant reason to believe that air quality will worsen." In addition, Senators John Edwards, John Kerry, and Joseph Lieberman attached a rider to a 2003 spending bill to delay the implementation of the new rule for six months; the Senate, however, defeated this effort on January 22, 2003. Congress also requested that the General Accounting Office (GAO) review the EPA’s foundation for promulgating the new rules. The GAO promptly investigated, and it released a report in August 2003 stating that “because [the] EPA relied primarily on anecdotal information from industry rather than a statistically valid sample or industrywide survey, the agency’s findings do not necessarily represent NSR’s effect on energy efficiency projects throughout the industries subject to the program.”

Just before the release of the GAO report, in July 2003, the EPA announced that it would reconsider parts of the December NSR rule. In this announcement, the EPA requested comments on six limited areas of the rule, including the designation of clean units, the method of assessing air emissions from a twenty-four month baseline period, and the method of measuring emissions increases. In late October 2003, the EPA responded to these comments and preserved most of the rule as is, with only two minor adjustments.

In a per curiam opinion delivered in June 2005, the District of Columbia Circuit upheld key provisions of the regulation as permissible interpretations of the Clean Air Act entitled to Chevron deference and as not otherwise “arbitrary and capricious” under the Administrative Procedure Act. The court rested much of its decision on the ambiguity of the statutory term “increases” and the broad deference owed agency decisions and

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138 GAO REPORT, DATA, supra note 111, at 16–17; see also GAO Faults EPA on Air Standards; Agency Lacked Data to Ease Rules, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 26, 2003, at 11.


140 See Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) and Non-Attainment New Source Review (NSR): Reconsideration, 68 Fed. Reg. 63,021 (Oct. 30, 2003) (where the EPA refined the technical definition of “replacement unit” and clarified that the PAL-baseline calculation for newly constructed units does not apply to modified units). See also Martin, supra note 126, at 366.

predictive judgments, especially in highly technical areas. The court upheld the following provisions: the actual-to-projected-actual baseline test; the ten-year look-back period (as well as the five-year look-back for electrical utilities); the growth demand exclusion; and the PAL program. The court did, however, vacate two provisions as clearly contradictory to statutory language: the clean unit applicability test, by which the EPA measured only emissions limitations and not actual emissions, and the PCP exception as it applied to projects causing collateral increases in pollution. In addition, the court remanded to the EPA for adequate explanation of the EPA’s decision to exempt a source from the recordkeeping requirements if the source owner or operator believes that its proposed modification shows “no reasonable possibility” of a significant emissions increase.

2. The Second Rule: Equipment Replacement.—While the agency continued to receive comments on its December 31, 2002 rule, it promulgated a second final rule regarding NSR. This rule, published in the Federal Register on October 27, 2003 and meant to take effect on December 26, 2003, rewrote the “routine maintenance, repair, and replacement” provision of the regulations for both attainment and nonattainment areas. The EPA asserted that the revision was meant to add certainty and clarity to the EPA’s previous case-by-case determination and to “remove disincentives to undertaking [routine maintenance] activities . . . [that] enhance[e] . . . efficiency, safety, reliability, and environmental performance.” Under the new rule, an activity qualifies as “routine” and therefore escapes NSR scrutiny if

(1) it involves replacement of any existing component(s) of a process unit with component(s) that are identical or that serve the same purpose as the replaced component(s); (2) the fixed capital cost of the replaced component, plus

142 Id. at 18, 23, 39–40.
143 Id. at 10.
144 Id. at 10, 36–39.
147 Id. at 61,251.
148 A “process unit” is defined as a “collection of structures and/or equipment that processes, assembles, applies, blends, or otherwise uses material inputs to produce or store an intermediate or completed product.” Id. at 61,259. Excluded from this definition are non-emitting facilities that are distinct from the source’s emitting components, such as administrative buildings and storage warehouses. Id. at 61,262. Also excluded is pollution control equipment that does not serve a “dual purpose” as process equipment; examples of such non-excludable “dual purpose” technology are condensers, recovery devices, and oxidizers. Id. at 61,260–61. Note that the installation of identical or functionally equivalent pollution control may also qualify for exclusion from NSR as a PCP. See supra notes 132–34 and accompanying text.

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costs of any activities that are part of the replacement activity, does not exceed 20 percent of the current replacement value of the process unit;\(^{149}\) and (3) the replacement(s) does not alter the basic design parameters of the process unit or cause the process unit to exceed any emission limitation or operational limitation (that has the effect of constraining emissions) that applies to any component of the process unit and that is legally enforceable.\(^ {150}\) Projects that qualify for the rule’s “safe harbor” would automatically be exempt from new source review. Projects that do not qualify for the automatic exclusion could nonetheless qualify for the exclusion under the WEPCO four-factor test.\(^ {151}\) The new rule thus expands the scope of grandfathering relief by providing an independent avenue for relief.

With its broad swath of exclusions, this new rule would exempt thousands of facilities from NSR requirements.\(^{152}\) Old sources would be able to “run harder and longer”\(^ {153}\) without having to install new pollution controls, effectively gaining “perpetual immunity” from NSR requirements.\(^ {154}\) Representatives from environmental groups and legislative opponents claimed

\(^{149}\) In estimating costs, a source operator can choose amongst various measurements, including appraisal value, insurance value, and investment value as adjusted for inflation. Equipment Replacement Provision of the Routine Maintenance, Repair and Replacement Exclusion, 68 Fed. Reg. at 61,262. Replacement activities that are “related” must be aggregated in this cost-threshold calculation, though merely contemporaneous activities are not necessarily sufficiently related to require aggregation. Id. at 61,258. Note that the EPA maintains that this twenty percent cut-off is consistent with Wisconsin Electric Power Co. v. Reilly (WEPCO), 893 F.2d 901, 910–11 (7th Cir. 1990), in which the court deemed WEPCO’s activities ineligible for the “routine maintenance” exception. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. Using 1991 dollars, the EPA estimated that WEPCO’s replacement of steam drums and air heaters cost between twenty-two and twenty-nine percent of the units’ total replacement value. Equipment Replacement Provision of the Routine Maintenance, Repair and Replacement Exclusion, 68 Fed. Reg. at 61,257. Some commentators, however, have challenged the EPA’s calculations of WEPCO’s costs. See Adrian P. Castro, Note, Far From Routine: Exempting Existing Sources From New Source Review Under the Equipment Replacement Provision, 33 Hofstra L. Rev. 711, 746 (2004).

\(^{150}\) Equipment Replacement Provision of the Routine Maintenance, Repair and Replacement Exclusion, 68 Fed. Reg. at 61,252. Examples of basic design parameters are maximum heat input and fuel input specifications, as well as output-based measurements. Id. at 61,258–59. Source owners and operators can propose design parameters of their choosing to the reviewing authority. Id. at 61,259.

\(^{151}\) Id. at 61,251–52, 61,257.

\(^{152}\) Catherine Cash & Gerald Karey, EPA Issues Final Rule ‘Clarifying’ NSR Restriction, Inside Energy With Fed. Lands, Sept. 1, 2003, at 1; Castro, supra note 149, at 743. The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) estimated that the rule will allow more air pollution from 17,000 industrial sources across the country. See Press Release, NRDC, Bush Administration to Gut Clean Air Act (Aug. 22, 2003), available at http://www.nrdc.org/media/pressreleases/030822.asp.

\(^{153}\) Cash & Karey, supra note 152, at 3 (citing Conrad Schneider, an official with the Clean Air Task Force).

\(^{154}\) The courts have long ruled that the “grandfathering” provisions of NSR were not intended to provide “perpetual immunity” to existing sources. See, e.g., Ala. Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 400 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (“The statutory scheme intends to ‘grandfather’ existing industries; but the provisions concerning modifications indicate that this is not to constitute a perpetual immunity from all standards under the PSD program.”).

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the rule "'eviscerate[d]' the NSR program" and "flatly contradict[ed] the clear language of the Clean Air Act."  

As did the earlier rule, the October 2003 rule generated a quick negative response. Twelve states, local governments, and a coalition of environmental and public health advocacy groups filed suit against the EPA, claiming violation of the Clean Air Act. They argued that only Congress has the authority to enact such significant changes to the Clean Air Act and that the EPA cannot simply ignore the purpose and intent of Congress in exercising its rulemaking powers. The District of Columbia Circuit stayed implementation of the rule on December 24, 2003, two days before the rule was to take effect.  

In July 2004, the EPA issued an administrative stay and announced that it would reconsider the rule; the legal proceedings were stayed pending the EPA's decision. In September 2004, the EPA Office of the Inspector General issued a report solicited by the Senate that sharply criticized the rule, in particular the twenty percent threshold and the EPA's conclusion that the rule would not result in increased emissions. The EPA strongly disputed these findings.  

In early June 2005, the EPA, having finished reconsideration, announced that it would preserve the routine maintenance rule as adopted in October 2003. Legal proceedings resumed. In March 2006, the District of Columbia Circuit invalidated the rule, holding unanimously that the rule was inconsistent with the statutory definition of "modification" as "any physical change in, or change in the method of operation of, a stationary source which increases the amount of any air pollutant emitted by such source or which results in the emission of any air pollutant not previously emitted." In July 2006, the District of Columbia Circuit denied requests  

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155 Cash & Karey, supra note 152. The first quotation is by Bill Becker, head of a state and local air pollution control association; the second is by Senator Joseph Lieberman.  
159 See EPA Sends Decision on Reconsideration of Equipment Replacement Rule to OMB, Chem. Reg. Daily (BNA) (June 1, 2005).  
160 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 211.  
162 New York v. EPA, 443 F.3d 880 (D.C. Cir. 2006).  
163 Id. at 883 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(4) (emphasis supplied by the court)).
for rehearing and rehearing en banc. At least one industry source speculated that the EPA would appeal the decision to the Supreme Court, and indeed the EPA did just that, albeit unsuccessfully. But there are indications that the EPA will effectively implement its revised routine maintenance rule through its enforcement discretion. Thus, even the one aspect of the EPA’s revisions to the NSR regulations that has met with judicial resistance may yet be implemented.

In summary, in 2002 the Bush Administration undertook a clear break with the practice of more than two decades—by Democratic and Republican administrations alike—of trying to derive a consistent, workable definition of the term “modification” as used in the Clean Air Act. The Bush Administration abandoned the prior efforts and significantly expanded the scope of the grandfathering of existing plants so that these plants get the benefits of modernization without expending the costs to meet the requirements of the Clean Air Act. Nor is the trend at an end: the EPA has announced plans to further narrow the scope of “modifications” that would trigger new source review.

E. The Judiciary and Grandfathering

The Executive is not the only branch of government that has sought to expand grandfathering in recent years. The government brought suit in 2005 against the Duke Power Company, alleging that the utility had failed (under the regulations before the Bush Administration amendments) to comply with the new source review requirements under the PSD program. Duke Power Company argued that its actions did not trigger new source review even though its net emissions post-modifications increased because its hourly emissions rate did not increase.

The district court in North Carolina, and then the Fourth Circuit, agreed. The district court reasoned that the EPA’s PSD regulations on their face required an increase in hourly emissions rate for there to be a “major modification.” The Fourth Circuit affirmed; the court held that the EPA’s

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165 Id. (quoting Scott Segal, Director of the Electric Reliability Coordinating Council).


168 Cook, supra note 13, at A-2 (“The [EPA] said it is moving forward with a proposed rulemaking to narrow the definition of the emissions increases that trigger new source review emissions control requirements ... ”). Indeed, the EPA has indicated that this remains the case even in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in the Duke Energy case. See id.

PSD regulations should not be read to deem an increase in net emissions a major modification that triggered new source review on the ground that such a reading would render the PSD regulations inconsistent with the EPA’s NSPS regulations, which looked to increases in hourly emissions rate as the basis for new source review. The Fourth Circuit reasoned that Congress’s decision to define the term “modification” in the PSD statute by reference to the definition of the same term in the NSPS statute mandated the EPA to define the term identically in its regulations.

Leaving to the side the issues of statutory interpretation and administrative law, it is clear that the reasoning of the district court and that of the Fourth Circuit reflect an expansive view of the scope of grandfathering under the Clean Air Act. Renovations often allow companies to leave their plants in operation for longer hours with no greater hourly emissions rates than they exhibited before the renovations. Exempting such renovations from triggering new source review leaves such plants to continue to enjoy the benefits of grandfathering. As Judge Posner explained in United States v. Cinergy Corp., a case rejecting the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning, such an interpretation “would give [a] company an artificial incentive to renovate a plant and by so doing increase the hours of the plant’s hours of operation, rather than to replace the plant.” The District of Columbia Circuit also rejected the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning in the course of reviewing challenges to the Bush Administration’s proposed regulations. However, a district court in Alabama agreed with the reasoning of the North Carolina federal district court and subsequently expressly dismissed the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in Cinergy.

Though the government took the position before the district court and Fourth Circuit that an increase in net emissions triggered new source review, it did not seek review of the Fourth Circuit’s decision in the Supreme

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171 Id. at 542.
172 458 F.3d 705, 709 (7th Cir. 2006), petition for cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2034 (2007).


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Court. Environmental organizations that had intervened in the case as plaintiffs did, however, and the Supreme Court agreed to hear the appeal.\textsuperscript{176} Earlier this year, the Court rejected the district court’s and the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning,\textsuperscript{177} holding that Congress could employ a referential definition yet leave room for the EPA to define “modification” differently under the NSPS and PSD programs.\textsuperscript{178}

The Court’s rejection of an expansive view of grandfathering under the Clean Air Act apparently will not prevent the Bush Administration from further pushing to extend even greater grandfathering. The same day the Court decided \textit{Duke Energy}, the EPA announced that, notwithstanding the Court’s decision, it would move forward with additional revisions to the NSR regulations to further narrow the scope of modifications that trigger new source review.\textsuperscript{179} Indeed, one industry spokesperson asserted that, insofar as the Court’s decision was grounded on statutory interpretation and administrative law rather than policy, the case simply affirmed the EPA’s broad discretion and, as such, “should actually place prospective rulemaking on firmer ground.”\textsuperscript{180} And almost immediately, the EPA heeded this plea by proposing regulations for power plants that are consistent with the Fourth Circuit’s approach and contrary to the position that the government had pressed before the Fourth Circuit.\textsuperscript{181} Further, in cases in which the EPA has published proposed regulations expanding the scope of grandfathering, it has indicated that it will bring enforcement actions only for violations of these proposed rules, and not for violations of the more stringent rules in effect at the time of the conduct.\textsuperscript{182}

\section*{II. EFFECTS ON NEW INVESTMENT AND AIR QUALITY}

In the remainder of this Article, we critically examine the EPA’s recent revisions to the new source review regulations. In this Part, we discuss how

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{177} See Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp, 127 S. Ct. 1423, 1435 (2007) (criticizing the district court for assuming that the EPA’s decision to exempt mere increases in hours of operation would also necessarily exempt physical changes that resulted in increased hours of operation).
\item \textsuperscript{178} See id.
\item \textsuperscript{179} See Cook, supra note 13, at A-2 ("The decision does not affect [the] EPA’s plan to proceed with the emissions test rule," EPA spokeswoman Jennifer Wood told BNA April 2.").
\item \textsuperscript{180} Id. (quoting Scott Segal, Director of the Electric Reliability Coordinating Council).
\item \textsuperscript{181} See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
\end{itemize}
the new regulations would prolong the existence of older, dirtier facilities and give polluters incentives to make undesirable investment decisions.

A. Prolonged Existence of Older Plants

Before we turn to a specific examination of how the new regulations would prolong the existence of older plants, we explain in general terms how a differential system with stringent regulations for new plants and a virtual lack of regulation of existing sources creates a disincentive to modernization. We then explain how the current statutory and regulatory framework specifically creates such a disincentive.

1. The "Old Plant Effect" in General.—Different regulatory standards for old and new plants distort the economic analysis that existing plant owners undertake when deciding whether to modernize or replace a plant. Stricter standards for new and substantially modified plants make building a new plant or substantially modifying an old plant more expensive propositions than they otherwise would be. In contrast, laxer standards for existing plants make retaining unmodified, older plants in operation a less expensive option. The academic literature refers to this phenomenon as the "old plant effect."[183]

The old plant effect manifests itself in two ways. First, older plants are maintained in operation longer than is economically efficient, as empirical evidence demonstrates.[184] For example, Randy Nelson, Tom Tietenberg,
and Michael Donihue present empirical evidence that differential environmental regulations delay plant retirement.\textsuperscript{185} Michael Maloney and Gordon Brady agree,\textsuperscript{186} concluding that environmental regulations produce an average four-year increase in plant retention, and also finding that increased environmental regulation is negatively correlated with new plant construction.\textsuperscript{187} Randy Becker and Vernon Henderson likewise conclude that grandfathering outside the electricity-generating industry had the effects of "rais[ing] survival rates [of plants,] limiting ‘natural’ plant turnover, and keeping otherwise unprofitable operations in business."\textsuperscript{188} Robert Stavins recently canvassed empirical examinations of the effects of vintage-differentiated environmental regulations as part of a study of new source review of motor vehicle emissions.\textsuperscript{189} He notes that more stringent regulation of new motor vehicles depressed new car sales "by between 2% and 4% over the first five years after the regulation came into force."\textsuperscript{190} Moreover, his more general survey confirms the general notion that application of more stringent standards to new sources tends to lengthen the lives of older plants, both inside and outside the electricity-generating industry.\textsuperscript{191}

Second, more stringent standards on new sources may worsen environmental quality because they discourage the introduction of those new sources that would be subject to their requirements. This reaction thus ren-


\textsuperscript{187} \textit{Id.} at 215–22.


\textsuperscript{190} \textit{Id.} at 46 (citing Howard K. Gruenspecht, \textit{Differentiated Regulation: The Case of Auto Emissions Standards}, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 328, 330 (1982)).

\textsuperscript{191} \textit{Id.} at 50–56; see also John A. List, Daniel Millimet & Warren McHone, \textit{The Unintended Disincentive in the Clean Air Act}, 4 ADVANCES IN ECON. ANAL. & POL’Y 1 (2004) (finding empirical evidence that new source review retards modification rates while doing little to accelerate the closure of existing dirty plants). But see Arik Levinson, \textit{Grandfather Regulations, New Source Bias, and State Air Toxics Regulation}, 28 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 299 (1999) (finding no statistically significant differences in capital vintage or investment between plants in states that grandfather new sources of pollution, plants in states that have no air toxics regulations, and plants in states that regulate both new and existing sources).
ders the stringent new source standards largely irrelevant. Once again, empirical evidence bears out this prediction. Stavins explains that as a result of the incentive to keep older motor vehicles in operation, motor vehicle pollution emissions actually rose for several years following the introduction of stricter pollution control standards for new vehicles.

An example, summarized in Table 1, illustrates the point. Consider A, the owner of a power-generating plant. A is contemplating replacing the plant. In making this decision, A will take into account the costs and benefits of any action. Presumably, A will factor into her economic analysis the costs necessary to comply with applicable environmental requirements. To the extent that environmental compliance costs are identical, the environmental regulation will not influence A's decision. If, however, the environmental compliance costs vary depending upon A's action, that differential may well distort A's decision.

Say that the annual operating cost of an existing facility is $100, while—as one might expect because of the greater efficiencies generally offered by newer plants—the annual operating cost of a new facility with the same production capacity is $90 (including annualized capital cost). Assuming that A acts economically, A will choose to construct a new facility. This result will not change if the applicable environmental regulation imposes uniform compliance costs.

But now say that the applicable environmental regulation imposes costs of $20 if A constructs a new facility but no cost if A retains her existing facility. The modified annual operating cost of a new facility is $110, while the annual operating cost of the existing facility remains $100. Accordingly, A will now opt to retain her existing facility in operation.

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192 See BIEWALD ET AL., supra note 18, at 3 (finding that the complete elimination of grandfathering of old plants would reduce sulfur dioxide emissions by 7.3 million tons and nitrous oxide emissions by 3.3 million tons, amounting to a 75% reduction in the emissions of these pollutants by old plants, and that the elimination of the "old plant effect" would result in an approximately 40% reduction in total sulfur dioxide emissions and a 15% reduction in total nitrous oxide emissions); Maloney & Brady, supra note 186, at 222–24 (finding that a 1% increase in the age of a plant results in a 1% increase in emissions and that, at the time of the study, regulations had caused a 27% increase in total emissions).

193 See Stavins, supra note 189, at 46.

194 We assume that plant owners will act in their economic self-interest. That need not be entirely the case; for example, plant owners might choose to reduce pollution for altruistic reasons. Cf. Timothy F. Malloy, Regulating by Incentives: Myths, Models, and Micromarkets, 80 TEX. L. REV. 531, 532–36 (2002) (questioning the notion that corporations are monolithic actors that seek always and only to maximize profits). But even if other motivations may drive owners to some extent, it is reasonable to expect that economic self-interest will remain a substantial consideration.
Table 1: Example of the “Old Plant Effect”

A, the owner of a power-generating plant, is contemplating upgrading or replacing the plant.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Situation 1: Absent Environmental Regulation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Annual operating cost of the existing facility (including annualized capital cost)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Annual operating cost of a comparable new facility (including annualized capital cost)</td>
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<tr>
<td>A will choose to construct a new facility.</td>
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</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Situation 2: With Environmental Regulation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cost of environmental regulation for a new facility</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cost of environmental regulation for an existing facility</td>
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<tr>
<td>Annual operating cost of the existing facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual operating cost of a new facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A will now opt to retain her existing facility in operation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The environmental regulation thus distorts A’s behavior. In effect, the law creates a barrier to new plant construction. In this scenario, firms will be less likely to construct new plants than they would be in the absence of regulation. And the incentive to retain older plants in operation may give rise to a perverse result: Environmental conditions may be worse with more stringent regulation than they would be under less stringent regulation. An extension of the above example makes this clear. Assume that the old plant emits five units of pollution per ton of output; that a new, unregulated plant would emit three units because of its greater efficiency; and that a new plant subject to regulation would emit one unit. To the extent that, as in the example, the plant owner opts to retain her existing facility in operation, the old plant effect will result in the continuing emission of five units.

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195 Cf. Jonathan Remy Nash, Too Much Market? Conflict Between Tradable Pollution Allowances and the “Polluter Pays” Principle, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 465, 505–06 (2000) (arguing that tradable pollution permit regimes that “grandfather” permits to existing polluters give rise to a barrier to exit, i.e., an incentive “not to exit the industry[,] by shielding [grandfathered firms] from new competition”). The environmental regulation described in the text would probably not give rise to a barrier to exit since the issue is not one of competition from new market entrants: Electricity-generating utilities will either retain existing plants in existence (modernized or otherwise) or construct new plants. Nonetheless, the barriers to exit and new plant construction arise out of similar incentive effects.

196 See Becker & Henderson, supra note 188, at 415 (concluding, based upon empirical data, that “[g]randfathering of preregulation plants raises [plant] survival rates, limiting ‘natural’ plant turnover and keeping otherwise unprofitable operations in business”).
In contrast, if new plants were unregulated, the facility owner would opt to erect a new facility in place of the old plant, with a resulting pollution level of only three units. Thus, less stringent environmental regulation may increase environmental quality.

But more stringent environmental regulation for new sources will not always lead to worse environmental quality. In some variations—for example, if the annualized cost of complying with new source regulation is $8 instead of $20—the old plant will close down and be replaced by a new, regulated plant. In general, the question whether grandfathering combined with more stringent regulation of new sources will lead to more pollution is an empirical one. Grandfathering and more stringent regulation could lead to more or less pollution. They also might lead to more pollution in the short run (while the lives of existing sources are extended) but less pollution in the long run (once existing sources are eventually retired), as in the case of motor vehicles.197

Where the drawbacks of grandfathering preexisting sources by imposing less stringent (or no) controls outweigh the benefits of regulating new sources more stringently, the question arises as to how those negative effects can be reduced or eliminated. Because the old plant effect is the result of differential environmental obligations being imposed on old and new sources, it can be mitigated by decreasing the difference between the two standards. This can be achieved in one of two ways: The lower standards imposed on older sources can be raised, or the higher standards imposed on newer sources can be lowered. Since the latter option would essentially entail not implementing a new legal regime—effectively freezing the contemporary regulatory regime in place—that option is not likely to be attractive. Despite this option’s lack of appeal, the new regulations are an implementation of it, as we discuss below.198 Instead, limiting or eliminating the more lenient treatment of existing plants achieves a better solution to the old plant effect.

2. The Old Plant Effect Under the Previous Statutory and Regulatory Regime.—Congress decided under the Clean Air Act to treat existing plants more leniently than new plants.199 The Act’s grandfathering could have been limited significantly had it been interpreted narrowly to extend only to unmodified plants. However, since the early days of the regime, the regulatory system has provided an exception for plant modifications that constitute “routine maintenance, repair, and replacement.”200
Before the current regulations were promulgated, the regulatory regime used a case-by-case approach to decide whether a given plant modification or renovation was simply routine maintenance, repair, or replacement, or whether it went beyond that and therefore triggered new source review. This case-by-case approach allowed the government to ensure that the policies underlying the routine maintenance exception were borne out in practice. While a case-by-case approach may be costly for government to administer and may create planning difficulties for societal actors, it allows government to keep a tight and reasoned constraint on grandfathering relief.

3. The Old Plant Effect Under the New Regulations.

The new regulations effectively subject some existing plants to more stringent regulation than others. Accordingly, they may give rise to perverse incentives in this situation as well. Specifically, the new regulations may introduce a secondary old plant effect, in addition to the old plant effect created by the preexisting grandfathering regime.

At the outset, we note an important difference between our general discussion of the old plant effect above and the applicability of the old plant effect in the context of the new regulations. Under the general discussion, we assumed that the plant owner had to choose between two options: building a new plant or retaining the existing plant in operation as-is. To evaluate the new regulations, by contrast, we must assume the plant owner has a third option: conducting substantial but not extensive improvements to the existing plant such that, under the new regulations, new source review would not be triggered. We will refer to this option as "significant improvements."

Assuming that new plants are subject to regulation while old plants are not, the treatment of plants that undergo significant improvements can affect plant owners' decisions as to whether to leave their existing plants in operation. Keeping with the example from the previous Subsection, say that the annual cost to A of a new plant is $90 (including annualized capital cost); of an existing plant subject to significant improvements is $95; and of an unmodified existing plant is $100. Further assume that environmental regulations will impose an additional $15 annual cost on a new plant but no cost on an unmodified existing plant. In this case, A's ultimate decision as to how to proceed will depend upon whether the environmental regulations apply to a plant that has undergone significant improvements. If the regulations apply, then A's best option is leave the existing plant in operation un-
modified. If, however, the regulations do not apply, as under the current regime, then A’s best option is instead to undertake the renovations.

Thus, under this scenario, the new regulations remove at least part of the barrier to modernization by encouraging at least some renovations and also illustrate the old plant effect’s implication that less stringent environmental regulation may achieve greater environmental protection.

There are, however, other possible scenarios under which the new regulations lead to environmentally undesirable effects. Consider a modification of the previous example under which the cost of compliance with environmental regulations is $8 instead of $15. Now if the environmental regulations apply to a plant that has undergone significant modifications, then A’s preferred option will be to construct a new plant. If the regulations do not apply, however, as under the current regime, then A will choose instead to modify the existing plant.

Under this scenario and others like it, the new regulations will impede new construction and artificially encourage modifications that retain existing plants in operation. Under the original example, the new regulations actually erect such a barrier. First, the regulations encourage owners to renovate existing plants rather than construct new ones. Second, in general, the regulations tend to encourage plant owners to invest comparatively smaller amounts in their plants. Indeed, because renovations that exceed twenty percent of a facility’s current replacement value trigger the stringent new source standards, the new regulations tend to discourage plant owners from investing amounts greater than twenty percent.

Tables 2A, 2B, 3A, and 3B help to elucidate the point. To the extent that the new regulations mitigate the old plant effect, the solution that the

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202 The $100 annualized cost of that option is less than both the $105 annualized cost of a new plant and the $110 annualized cost of the renovated plant.
203 The $95 annualized cost of that option is less than both the $105 annualized cost of a new plant and the $100 annualized cost of the existing, unmodified plant.
204 The $98 annualized cost of that option is less than both the $100 annualized cost of the existing, unmodified plant and the $103 cost of the renovated plant.
205 The $95 cost of that option is less than both the $100 annualized cost of the existing, unmodified plant and the $98 cost of the new plant.
206 Say, for example, that A is committed to undertake a renovation of a facility that would cost 19% of the facility’s value. Undertaking simultaneous renovations costing another 6% of the facility’s value may make sense if the additional renovations would result in the installation of a uniform technological standard; in other words, a 25% (by value) total investment may be economically efficient because of economies of scope. Cf. Becker & Henderson, supra note 188, at 383 (arguing, based upon empirical data, that “in setting up new plants or engaging in expansion of existing plants, relative to phased-in investments of the past, now plants in nonattainment areas make investments in bigger lumps (i.e., ‘all at once,’ relatively speaking), to avoid repeated negotiations and to ensure consistency of equipment specifications across what would have been different investment phases in the past”). The new regulations might nonetheless induce A to undertake only the 19% investment if the cost of complying with the stringent new source standards exceeds the benefits offered by the economies of scope.
Bush Administration’s regulatory revisions invokes is the latter of the two possible solutions outlined above. By shifting some renovations from the “trigger” to the “do not trigger” side of the ledger, the new regulations provide for more lax new source review. As such, the new regulations “solve” the old plant effect problem by simply lowering the comparatively higher standard; this is reflected in Tables 2A and 2B.

Table 2A: Renovations and the Trigger of New Source Review Under the Previous Regulatory Scheme, Before Enactment of the New Regulations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Does Not Trigger New Source Review</th>
<th>Does Trigger New Source Review</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- No renovation</td>
<td>- Significant improvements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Routine maintenance</td>
<td>- Construction of a new source</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2B: Renovations and the Trigger of New Source Review After the Enactment of the New Regulations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Does Not Trigger New Source Review</th>
<th>Does Trigger New Source Review</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- No renovation</td>
<td>- Construction of a new source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Routine maintenance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Significant improvements</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Administration justified the new regulations by assuming that the predominant choice faced by plant owners is between undertaking a significant renovation and undertaking no renovation. This is reflected in Table 3A, with the relevant choices presented in italics. The Administration argued that, because the previous regulatory regime applied new source review to significant renovations, the previous regime encouraged plant owners to undertake no renovations. The regulatory revisions remove the disincentive to undertake significant renovations.

207 See supra Part I.D.
208 To the extent that the new regulations mitigate the old plant effect, they do so in an undesirable way. The new regulations “solve” the old plant effect problem by simply lowering the comparatively higher standard and, as we have discussed above, this is generally not an advisable solution to the problem. See supra notes 203–06 and accompanying text. There may be reasons to accept some degree of grandfathering and the accompanying effects, including the old plant effect. But to the extent that the government seeks to reduce the old plant effect, the answer should be to limit grandfathering, not to repeal in part or in whole the new legal regime.
210 See, e.g., Final Brief of Respondent U.S. EPA at 40–46, New York v. EPA, 443 F.3d 880 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (No. 03–1380) (arguing that the new regulations will create environmental benefits by encouraging those modifications that the previous new source review regime discouraged).
But the Administration misstates the problem: Given the age of the grandfathered plants, plant owners may not be choosing between undertaking significant renovations and undertaking no renovations; rather, they may be choosing between undertaking significant renovations and constructing new plants, as reflected in Table 3B. Given that choice, the shift of significant renovations to the “does not trigger new source review” side of the ledger serves only to encourage plant owners to undertake significant renovations instead of constructing new plants.

Table 3A: The Bush Administration’s Framing of the Choice Faced by Plant Owners (Relevant Options in Italics)

| No Renovations: not subject to new source review either before or after the new regulations’ enactment | Significant Renovations: subject to new source review before the new regulations’ enactment, but not after | Construction of a New Plant: subject to new source review both before the new regulations’ enactment and after |

Table 3B: Another Possible Choice Faced by Plant Owners (Relevant Options in Italics)

| No Renovations: not subject to new source review either before or after the new regulations’ enactment | Significant Renovations: subject to new source review before the new regulations’ enactment, but not after | Construction of a New Plant: subject to new source review both before the new regulations’ enactment and after |

Whether the new regulations will “solve” the old plant effect by encouraging significant renovations or act as a barrier to new construction that otherwise would and should take place depends upon which of the two scenarios presented is closer to reality. In other words, it is an empirical question. Support for the Administration’s contention—that a change to the “routine maintenance, repair, and replacement” rule is needed to remove a great disincentive to modifications—is practically nonexistent.  

211 No empirical studies to date have specifically validated the hypothesis that the EPA’s 2003 Equipment Replacement Rule standard reduces plant investment in routine upgrades or modifications at existing plants. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADEMIES, INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CHANGES IN NEW SOURCE REVIEW PROGRAMS FOR STATIONARY SOURCES OF AIR POLLUTANTS 98 (2005) [hereinafter INTERIM REPORT]. Perhaps surprisingly, there is scant empirical literature on the NSR standards even prior to the 2003 rule. The EPA and industry experts have asserted that NSR requirements have in effect made certain improvements too costly to be undertaken, though there is no empirical data available to substantiate this contention.

In the EPA’s 2002 Report to the President regarding New Source Review, industry experts are cited for the proposition that the pre-Equipment Replacement Rule standard made routine maintenance and
The Administration has argued that to whatever extent the new regulations may have deleterious effects, they are on balance desirable because the efficiency benefits of having many plants upgrade outweigh the drawbacks of having unmodified plants remain in service longer. The Administration’s focus thus remains on the question of efficient energy production. Missing from the Administration’s account, however, is the possibility that new plants might not only be preferable from an environmental perspective but might also be able to produce energy more cheaply. There are indications that the trend in construction of new electricity-generating plants is in the direction of facilities that are both more environmentally friendly and more efficient than old plants. If that is so, the new regulations are undesirable both from an environmental and an efficiency perspective.

The new regulations also pay insufficient attention to the history of regulation. To whatever extent the new regulations might have made some sense at an earlier regulatory stage, that regulatory history likely renders the new regulations a poor option at this point in time. The early Clean Air Act legislative history reflects a compromise to accept an extension of existing plants’ lives in exchange for the application of very strict standards to the new plants that would replace them in the future. More than a third of a century after that compromise was struck, many of the plants that were in existence then remain in service now—far beyond the retirement date that most initially expected, even taking into account the introduction of life-repair “cost prohibitive to undertake, which, in turn, can adversely affect the availability and reliability of plant operations and discourage such projects.” EPA, NEW SOURCE REVIEW REPORT, supra note 97, at 9. In promulgating the 2003 rule, the EPA relied on anecdotal information about plant maintenance and repair projects that did not go forward because of the NSR standard since there was an absence of hard data that demonstrated that NSR disincentivized “routine maintenance, repair, and replacement” projects. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., EPA, RPT. NO. 2004-P-00034, EVALUATION REPORT: NEW SOURCE RULE CHANGE HARKS EPA’S ABILITY TO ENFORCE AGAINST COAL-FIRED ELECTRIC UTILITIES 15 (2004), available at http://www.epa.gov/oigearth/reports/2004/20040930-2004-P-00034.pdf [hereinafter OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., EVALUATION REPORT] (citing GAO REPORT, DATA, supra note 11). A lack of empirical data on point may suggest an intrinsic difficulty in determining why specific “routine maintenance, repair, and replacement” projects did not move forward since NSR is one of several variables affecting a plant’s choice to invest in maintenance and repair projects. INTERIM REPORT, supra, at 94 (“Firms and industries indicate instances when the potential to trigger NSR requirements made or might have made plant upgrades too costly to move forward. However, there is no way to independently corroborate such reports[,] and rigorous statistical studies of this phenomenon do not exist, partly because the lack of data and the difficulty in identifying the effects of NSR given all the varied influences of investment decisions.”). See generally supra notes 184–91 and accompanying text (discussing empirical studies).

212 See, e.g., Final Brief of Respondent U.S. EPA, supra note 210, at 68–89. The Administration also argued that in fact the proposed twenty percent safe harbor would not result in an emissions increase on a nationwide basis. See id. at 89–99.

213 Swift, supra note 184, at 376–77.

214 See infra note 227 and accompanying text (discussing the flawed, yet typical, government approach of emphasizing the ancillary costs of additional regulation over the ancillary benefits).

215 See supra Part I.A.
extending differential regulatory standards.\textsuperscript{216} In effect, we are now at the stage—indeed, often beyond the stage—where one reasonably might expect the grandfathered plants to be retired.\textsuperscript{217} One would expect the annual cost of a newly constructed plant to be less than the annual cost of a grandfathered plant, even taking into account the far more stringent environmental standards imposed on new plants.\textsuperscript{218}

The incentive to retain older power plants in operation is especially problematic. Old coal-burning electricity-generating power plants—located predominantly in the midwestern United States—generate a disproportionately large amount of pollution.\textsuperscript{219} In particular, these plants are largely responsible for the problem of acid precipitation in the northeastern United States and eastern Canada.\textsuperscript{220} Thus, the environmental impact of keeping those plants in operation over a longer period of time is especially dramatic.

The incentive to keep older plants in operation even longer than under the previous regime is not the only poor incentive that the new regulations might generate. The next Section explores other undesirable investment incentives that the new regulations might create.

\textbf{B. The New Regulations' Effects on Investment Decisions}

One portion of the revisions to the new source review regulations—the twenty percent regulatory safe harbor—would have predictable, and undesirable, effects on plant owners' investment decisions by erecting a barrier to modernization. We briefly survey these effects in this Section. First, as

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{216} See supra Part I.D.
\item \textsuperscript{217} See Potts, supra note 209, at 153 ("[Fifty-seven percent] of all fossil-fuel units (1,396 total units) [operating] in 2000 were built before the Clean Air Act was adopted in 1972." (citing U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO), AIR POLLUTION EMISSIONS FROM OLDER ELECTRIC-GENERATING UNITS 3 (2002), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02709.pdf)).
\item \textsuperscript{219} Put another way, the new regulations are inefficient because they draw a bright regulatory line between two options—renovating an existing facility and constructing a new one—that are, at this juncture, economically close substitutes. As David Weisbach has elucidated in the context of anti-tax-avoidance legislation, regulatory line-drawing between close substitutes is inefficient since the bright regulatory line is more likely to induce change in behavior that is undesirable. David A. Weisbach, \textit{An Economic Analysis of Anti-Tax-Avoidance Doctrines}, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 88, 96–99 (2002). In particular, given a choice between two close substitutes, only one of which is subject to regulation, societal actors are likely to choose the option that is free of regulation. \textit{Id.}; see David A. Weisbach, \textit{An Efficiency Analysis of Line Drawing in the Tax Law}, 29 J. LEG. STUD. 71, 74–79 (2000). In the context of environmental regulation, modifying an existing facility is (today) likely to be a close substitute for constructing a new facility. Thus, drawing a line between modification and new construction will encourage actors to avoid the regulated option—new construction—in favor of modification.
\item \textsuperscript{219} See, e.g., David R. Wooley, \textit{Environmental Comparability}, 12 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 276, 276 (1998) ("The pollution problems of electricity in the United States arise from the emissions of a few hundred antiquated power plants."); \textit{id.} at 278 ("Metals and CO\textsubscript{2} emissions are dramatically higher from older, inefficient power stations. Older plants often have poor heat-to-electricity conversion efficiencies, resulting in much larger fuel consumption and pollution emitted per unit of power generated.").
\end{itemize}
we discuss above, the new regulations may encourage plant owners not to invest funds in renovation that would cross the threshold and trigger the stringent new source standards.\footnote{See supra notes 201–14 and accompanying text.}

Second, the regulations, or the EPA’s stated internal policy following the District of Columbia Circuit’s rejection of the twenty percent safe harbor, may encourage plant owners to structure investments as a series of smaller-scale investments—even though one large-scale renovation would be economically preferable—simply to avoid the more stringent new source standards.\footnote{See Shi-Ling Hsu, What’s Old is New: The Problem with New Source Review, 29 REG. 36, 40 (2006) ("[P]lant owners will almost certainly find ingenious ways to gradually update their plants in increments costing less than [twenty] percent of the original plant cost.").} By way of example, say that $A$ has decided to undertake renovations to a plant that will cost thirty percent of the value of the plant. $A$ could structure the renovations in two stages, but this would add to the cost of the renovations—for example, because workers must come to the plant twice and perhaps duplicate some work that otherwise would be done only once—such that the cost of each stage of the bifurcated renovations would be nineteen percent of the value of the facility. The one-time renovation is clearly the more efficient option. But the new regulations might induce $A$ to undertake the two-stage approach if the cost of complying with the stringent new source standard exceeded the eight percent additional cost that bifurcation would impose.\footnote{Empirical data supports the hypothesis that the structure of environmental regulation might affect the long term structuring of plant investment decisions. Cf. Becker & Henderson, supra note 188, at 415–16 ("Investment or growth patterns of plants appear to be affected by regulation. In particular, relative to attainment areas, new plants subject to strong regulation in nonattainment areas start off significantly larger (more up-front investment), but over time (within 10 years) their sizes converge to those of plants in attainment areas (with more phased-in investments.").}

The Administration could attempt to treat related renovations as a single renovation for purposes of the safe harbor rule. Thus, two related fifteen percent renovations would count as a single thirty percent renovation that would trigger new source review. Such standards, however, are notoriously difficult to administer because they present the obvious question of how to define which renovations are “related.” And a great deal of the benefits of certainty that the Administration attributes to its new regulations would be lost.\footnote{We further note that even if the aggregation standard is effectively enforced, the question arises as to whether the costs of enforcement—in terms of both monitoring and litigation costs—would outweigh the purported benefits of the rule, which include greater certainty for societal actors. The Bush Administration advances the notion that one cost that the current regulatory system imposes—and, accordingly, one cost that its safe harbor would eliminate—is the uncertainty inherent in the case-by-case approach. See supra notes 110–12 and accompanying text.}

\footnote{221 See supra notes 201–14 and accompanying text.
222 See Shi-Ling Hsu, What’s Old is New: The Problem with New Source Review, 29 REG. 36, 40 (2006) ("[P]lant owners will almost certainly find ingenious ways to gradually update their plants in increments costing less than [twenty] percent of the original plant cost.").
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Moreover, it may make sense, once one has decided to undertake a large renovation, to take advantage of economies of scope and replace even more plant elements than the basic renovation requires. Consider the possibility that a part in an old, grandfathered power-generating plant dates from the original construction of the plant. The part is responsible for shutting down the plant and taking it off the regional power grid in the event of a plant overload. A modern version of the part (perhaps it is electronic whereas the original part is mechanical) might help to avoid local or even large-scale blackouts. In the context of a large-scale renovation, the plant owner may decide to replace the part even though the part is functioning well at the moment, simply because the renovation of the entire unit provides an opportune time to replace the part. In contrast, the part might not be replaced in the smaller renovation that results because of the twenty-percent rule; the rule therefore might preclude realizing the ancillary benefits of avoiding power outages.

III. INTERACTION WITH OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT

The new regulations effectively dilute the environmental standards that govern existing plants. The Administration justified this strategy on grounds of economic efficiency. But the Administration fails to recognize the ways in which the new regulations will interact with other Clean Air Act regulations. Because of these interconnections, the new regulations will impose more stringent regulation on sources beyond those that undertake renovations. This effect will increase the costs of the new regulations and will also distribute those costs in an undesirable manner.

The Clean Air Act establishes national primary and secondary ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) to guard against adverse effects on public rule but not a standard). This may provide a benefit in that actors who fear uncertainty may be more likely to take desirable actions under a rule than a standard.

But even assuming that the uncertainty imposes substantial costs, the Administration fails to notice of the uncertainty that the new regulations would introduce. From the description in the new regulation, the question whether to aggregate multiple modifications would be governed by a standard, not a rule. As such, it seems likely to generate substantial enforcement, monitoring, and litigation costs. Compare the somewhat analogous step transaction doctrine under the tax law. See, e.g., Cliff Gross, An Overview of U.S. Federal Tax Considerations Regarding Taxable and Tax-Free Corporate Acquisition Structures, in 9 TAX STRATEGIES FOR CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS, DISPOSITIONS, SPIN-OFFS, JOINT VENTURES, FINANCINGS, REORGANIZATIONS & RESTRUCTURINGS 777, 794 (PLI Tax Law & Estate Planning Course Handbook Series No. 2995, 2004) (noting that application of the step transaction doctrine “is often difficult to predict reliably”).

We are grateful to Professor Ross Baldick for suggesting this idea.


See supra notes 208–10.
health and public welfare, respectively.\textsuperscript{228} The NAAQS themselves are, as their name indicates, simply ambient standards; they do not, by themselves, regulate the pollution emissions at any one source (or group of sources). Still, the promulgation of NAAQS ultimately constrains the emissions of pollutants.\textsuperscript{229}

It stands to reason that, for the NAAQS to hold, a dilution of the standard applied to one set of sources will require the imposition of a comparatively stricter standard on another set of sources. Indeed, the Clean Air Act designates those counties where air quality does not equal or surpass the NAAQS as nonattainment areas,\textsuperscript{230} and imposes tight constraints on the construction and operation of new sources in such areas.\textsuperscript{231} One of the many requirements that a new source must satisfy in a nonattainment area is that the new source must obtain offsetting reductions in emissions from existing sources such that, in total, reasonable further progress is made toward attainment of the NAAQS.\textsuperscript{232} Nonattainment thus constrains the ability of new sources to locate in an area. In fact, to the extent that offsets are prohibitively expensive, the constraint may be absolute.

This notion—that, because of the constraints imposed by the NAAQS, grandfathering requires that comparatively stricter standards be applied to other sources—plays itself out in the context of two pairs of sets of sources. Consider first the effect of grandfathering existing sources on new sources in the same area. By imposing less stringent standards on existing sources, the Act makes it likely that comparatively more stringent standards will be imposed on new sources to meet the NAAQS.\textsuperscript{233} The new regulations further reduce the stringency of the existing source standards by allowing more renovations and repairs without triggering new source review. Even stricter standards on new sources would then be necessary in order to meet the NAAQS.\textsuperscript{234}

\textsuperscript{228} See generally Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b) (2000).

\textsuperscript{229} The Clean Air Act vests the states with authority to develop state implementation plans (SIPs) that are designed to achieve the NAAQS. See id. § 7410(a). While the Act grants the states the discretion to decide how the NAAQS are to be achieved, see, e.g., Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 256–57 (1976) (“The Amendments place the primary responsibility for formulating pollution control strategies on the States.”), at some point compliance with NAAQS for a pollutant must involve some limit on the total amount of the pollutant that can be released over some period of time. In other words, there is some amount of the pollutant such that, if that much of the pollutant is released over a period of time, the NAAQS cannot be met.

\textsuperscript{230} See 42 U.S.C. § 7407(b)(1).

\textsuperscript{231} See id. §§ 7501–09(a).

\textsuperscript{232} See id. §§ 7502(c)(5), 7503(a)(1).

\textsuperscript{233} It is conceivable that a state might, on its own, choose to regulate existing sources quite stringently under an SIP. But it would seem likely that greater lobbying access and power would be wielded by existing sources, with the likely result being that existing sources would enjoy the grandfathering the federal Act affords and in fact be regulated less stringently. See Keohane et al., supra note 183, at 315.

\textsuperscript{234} That is not to say that there is a zero-sum game. Pollution concentration will depend upon the characteristics and locations of pollutants emissions; in particular, the location and extent of harm ulti-
Alternatively, the effect of more liberal grandfathering could be to prevent the siting of new sources in nonattainment areas. The existence of grandfathered plants that contributes to an area's nonattainment may preclude the siting of new plants in that area, when in fact it would be more efficient to allow the new sources to begin operation and either discontinue or scale back the old plants' operations, or otherwise reduce the old plants' pollution outputs.

Second, the imposition of a less stringent standard on existing sources in one state may impose a comparatively more stringent standard on—or, more likely, impede the siting of—sources in another, downwind state. The presence of polluting facilities in one state may have considerable adverse effects on the ambient pollution levels in another, downwind state. The influx of pollution from sources in an upwind state may compel the downwind state, in designing a state implementation plan that will result in NAAQS compliance, to impose more stringent and additional constraints on the sources within its borders.

In both cases, then, some sources—new in-state sources and sources in downwind states—will be regulated more heavily while existing sources substantially escape regulation. It is generally the case that the marginal

mately caused by pollution emissions will depend, inter alia, upon location, wind patterns, topography, smokestack height, emissions velocity, and emissions temperature. See Nash & Revesz, supra note 220, at 577–78. Nonetheless, it remains the case generally to expect the increased pollutant concentrations that will result from a less stringent standard being imposed on some sources to be offset by decreased pollution concentrations resulting from a more stringent standard imposed on other sources, if overall pollutant concentrations are not to worsen.

We say "existence" and not "presence of grandfathered plants in the area" because emissions from a grandfathered plant in a location geographically far from the nonattainment area may travel to the area and contribute to the area's nonattainment status. See id. at 576 (discussing "regional pollutants").

The Act, by its terms, requires upwind states to include in their SIPs proscriptions against emitting pollutants in amounts that will either "contribute significantly to nonattainment in, or interfere with the maintenance by, any other State with respect to any such national primary or secondary ambient air quality standard, or . . . interfere with measures required to be included in the applicable implementation plan for any other State . . . to prevent significant deterioration of air quality or to protect visibility . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i). It also authorizes downwind states to petition the EPA for relief when emissions from a source, or group of sources, in an upwind state are causing such results. Id. § 7426(b). However, even if such relief is ultimately forthcoming, it can take considerable time to arrive. See, e.g., Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 249 F.3d 1032 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (responding to a petition filed in 1997); Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663, 669–70 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (upholding SIP call issued in 1998). Thus, in practice, the upwind pollution may have a constraining effect on downwind sources over an extended time horizon.

The Act leaves it to states to develop and implement SIPs that will achieve NAAQS compliance. See supra note 229.

Indeed, this conflict of interest over new source review between upwind and downwind states is evidenced by the fact that fifteen states, mostly from the northeastern United States, filed suit against the EPA, challenging the new rule, while fourteen midwestern and western states intervened on the EPA's behalf. See New York v. EPA, 443 F.3d 880, 881–82 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
costs of pollution reduction rise steeply as a source increases its pollution control. Regulating a source more stringently imposes higher marginal costs. It is therefore likely to be economically inefficient for the new rules to regulate some sources stringently while allowing others to substantially escape regulation. The burden of pollution reduction would be more economically efficient if it were spread more evenly across sources.

Moreover, there are likely to be cross-industry siting effects. The NAAQS apply uniformly on the basis of geography. Thus, to the extent that the existence of grandfathered plants contributes to an area's nonattainment status, the effect of that classification is not restricted to the siting of new plants in the same industry as the grandfathered plants. Rather, the effect may extend to plants used in other industries that emit the same pollutant. Thus, the resulting inefficiencies may be quite extensive.

See, e.g., Daniel H. Cole & Peter Z. Grossman, When is Command-and-Control Efficient? Institutions, Technology, and the Comparative Efficiency of Alternative Regulatory Regimes for Environmental Protection, 1999 Wis. L. Rev. 887, 916–17 (noting that the academic prediction and the empirical evidence tend to confirm that marginal pollution control costs rise steeply as the levels of control rise).

In addition to the inefficiencies with existing law discussed in the text, much of the benefit that the Administration attributes to the new regulations is already available under the EPA's bubble policy. Moreover, to the extent the new regulations extend relief beyond the bubble policy, they do so in an undesirable way.


The bubble policy effectively allows a plant owner to renovate a facility and increase the amount of pollution emitted without triggering new source review, provided that the group of sources that lie "under the bubble" do not exhibit an overall net increase in emissions. In other words, an increase in emissions at a renovated source can be offset by a reduction at another source under the bubble, such that the renovation will not trigger new source review.

The bubble policy is especially valuable for owners of sources located in nonattainment areas and areas subject to the PSD program. (The PSD program seeks to avoid decreases in air quality in areas in which existing air quality is already, or should be, pristine, i.e., in excess of the NAAQS. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7471–79.)

Both programs impose strict requirements on new sources located in the areas they govern. The nonattainment program requires, for example, offsetting emissions reductions and that the new source comply with the lowest achievable emissions rate. See id. §§ 7502(c)(5), 7503(a)(1)–(2). The PSD program requires that new sources receive a permit and employ the best available control technology for pollution reduction. See id. § 7475(a)(1), (4).

These programs adopt the same definition of modification for purposes of their new source review provisions. See id. § 7501(4) ("For the purpose of the [nonattainment program] . . . [t]he terms 'modifications' and 'modified' mean the same as the term 'modification' as used in section [7411(a)(4)] of this title."); id. § 7479(2)(C) ("For the purpose of the [PSD program] . . . [t]he term 'construction' when used in connection with any source or facility, includes the modification (as defined in section [7411(a)] of this title) of any source or facility."). Because they do so, the benefit of the bubble policy
IV. THE NEW RULES AS TRANSITION RELIEF

Grandfathering of existing sources is a form of relief from a new, more stringent legal regime. As such, the propriety of grandfathering is a subpart of the more general question of how best to effect a transition from one legal regime to another. In this Part, we describe the debate over new source review that addresses the legal and economic aspects of legal transitions. We explain the literature's general presumption against transition relief. Then, in evaluating the new regulations as a form of transition relief, we explore their incentive and fairness effects. Considerations of incentive effects generally militate against legal transition relief. Moreover, even if incentive effects might justify some limited transition relief here, the new regulations far exceed any appropriate transition relief. And, similarly, to whatever extent concerns of fairness might justify limited transition relief, the new regulations go beyond what fairness demands.

A. Grandfathering and the New Regulations as Transition Relief

Grandfathering is a form of transition relief. Not applying a new legal rule to existing actors shields those actors from the new legal regime.\(^2\) Transition policy can provide different degrees of relief from the new legal regime. At one extreme is a transition policy that offers no special treatment whatsoever. The other extreme is a policy that offers full relief—for example, a policy of permanent grandfathering or a policy of full compensation for the cost of complying with the new regulatory standards. In between the two extremes are policies, like limited grandfathering, that offer partial relief.\(^3\) The grandfathering under the Clean Air Act is a form of partial relief, insofar as it applies only to existing sources until they undertake modifications. The new regulations would first give firms more flexibility in determining the baselines against which emissions increases are measured,
shielding additional sources from new source review.\textsuperscript{244} The new regulations would also graft a safe harbor onto the case-by-case examination of modifications of pollution sources.\textsuperscript{245} The safe harbor would extend transition relief beyond the scope authorized by the previous regime.\textsuperscript{246} Thus, the new regulations would extend greater transition relief than was previously available.

\textbf{B. Incentive Effects}

Given that grandfathering in general, and the new revisions to the regulations in particular, are examples of transition relief, it is appropriate to consider the extent to which legal transition relief is ever justified. As we discuss in this Section, rules of legal transition relief are generally inadvisable because they give rise to poor incentives: They discourage actors from anticipating changes in legal rules, and they encourage actors to seek economic rents from transition relief regimes. Moreover, to whatever extent the possible benefits of transition relief outweigh the costs associated with these incentive effects, limited transition relief may be justified. The new regulations, however, far exceed whatever the justifiable level of transition relief might be.

First, relief from a transition in legal regimes is ordinarily inadvisable because it creates an incentive for societal actors not to anticipate changes in the governing law. As a general matter, societal actors are not afforded public relief from change.\textsuperscript{247} For example, a firm that uses a particular technology in its production process runs the risk that the technology will change. If that happens, the firm may lose profits and perhaps go out of business altogether if it does not modernize its production process; no legal

\textsuperscript{244} See supra notes 118–25 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{245} See supra notes 146–51 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{246} To see this, note first that the set of renovations that will not trigger new source review under the new regulations cannot be smaller than the set that would not trigger such review absent these regulations. In terms of set theory, let $A$ equal the set of renovations that can be undertaken without triggering new source review under the existing regulatory scheme, and let $B$ equal the set of renovations that can be undertaken without triggering new source review under the safe harbor. Because the Administration would have its safe harbor function in addition to the existing regulations, the complete set of renovations that could be undertaken without triggering new source review, under the regulatory scheme after the addition of the new regulations, would be represented by $A \cup B$. And necessarily, $A \subseteq A \cup B$.

There is reason, moreover, to expect the latter set to be larger. First, the twenty percent limit in the regulation seems, at first blush at least, rather high. Further, the addition of a safe harbor—even a safe harbor with a comparatively low percentage limit—would be expected to augment, if marginally, the set of renovations that will not trigger new source review. Adhering to set theory, the only way it can be that $A = A \cup B$ is if $B \subseteq A$, i.e., if every renovation that is shielded from new source review under the safe harbor was already shielded from new source review under the existing regulatory structure.

Indeed, it would be surprising if the safe harbor proposal did not allow for more renovations to be undertaken insofar as that was one of the Administration’s justifications for proposing the rule in the first place. See supra notes 147–53 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{247} Private relief in the form of insurance may be available.
relief shields the firm from the market pressure to adopt the technological change.

The possibility of a change in legal regime is simply a subclass of the larger set of risks that societal actors face. In general, the government does not provide protection against such risks. Absent special justification, a change in legal regime should be treated similarly to other types of changes societal actors face. Thus, as a general rule, legal transition relief is undesirable. The prospect of transition relief inefficiently discourages actors from anticipating legal change. In contrast, placing the risk of legal change on societal actors encourages them to anticipate legal change and to comply voluntarily and in advance. Societal actors who are governed by one legal regime and who foresee a coming change in that regime will be less likely to conform voluntarily to that change if they also foresee a likelihood that the government will afford them transition relief from it. Moreover, when the government enacts a new legal regime with transition relief, it sends a signal to society at large that, in general, changes in legal standards will not govern existing actors. Actors who lie beyond the scope of the particular regime will be less likely to anticipate or to comply voluntarily with new legal standards in the regime that governs their own behavior.

In light of the general undesirability of transition relief, the broader the transition relief, the more problematic it is. Narrower transition relief gives rise to undesirable incentives in a smaller set of societal actors than does broader transition relief. The grandfathering currently in effect is a form of partial transition relief. The new regulations would expand the scope of partial transition relief and would therefore be even less desirable under this analysis.

This incentives-based justification for the general presumption against transition relief—that the absence of transition relief creates an incentive to anticipate changes in the legal regime—is applicable to environmental regulation. Generally, it is beneficial to have societal actors anticipate, and voluntarily comply with, coming changes in the legal landscape. And it hardly

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248 See Kaplow, Legal Transitions, supra note 242, at 522–36 (showing that “government-created risk ... is little different from market-created risk, when viewed from an economic perspective”).

249 See id. at 520–21 (arguing that “transitional relief disturbs rather than corrects a properly functioning market”). See generally Kaplow, Transition Policy, supra note 243 (developing a more balanced framework for assessing transition gains and losses). In reaching this conclusion, Kaplow relies upon two basic assumptions: that “the transition policy to be employed in a given context is well-known in advance and will be followed consistently in the future,” Kaplow, Legal Transitions, supra note 242, at 520, and that the legal reforms in question are “desirable at the time they are made,” id. at 521.

250 See Saul Levmore, Changes, Anticipations, and Reparations, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1657, 1662–63 (1999) (arguing that “it will pay for firms to anticipate government regulation in order to avoid liability or wasted investments”).

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seems unreasonable to expect industrial sources, such as those subject to new source review, to anticipate legal change.\textsuperscript{251}

One might argue that the incentive to anticipate legal change can be excessive in some cases. For example, an actor who foresees a change in technology and installs that technology might find that technology was about to advance again.\textsuperscript{252} Depending upon the cost of replacing old equipment with new and the rate at which technology is advancing, plant owners might rationally decide that it is too costly to comply with all technological changes, even ones that they anticipate.\textsuperscript{253}

To remedy this situation, grandfathering may be desirable where precautionary investments are “durable” for some period of time, and especially where the cost of including pollution control technology in new

\textsuperscript{251} To the extent that the justification not to grant transition relief is to create an incentive for societal actors to anticipate changes in the law, one must assume that those actors in fact reasonably can anticipate such changes. In effect, the rule against transition relief assumes that actors will have the capacity to anticipate, and act rationally in the face of, changes in legal regimes. See generally Kyle D. Logue, Legal Transitions, Rational Expectations, and Legal Process, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 211, 214 (2003) (arguing that this assumption is most valid in transitions that “involve[,] or have the characteristics of) incremental changes in the common law”). While this assumption is not universally valid, it seems most likely to be true for sophisticated actors, especially corporations. \textit{Id.} at 229–30. For better or for worse, environmental regulation tends to focus on industrial polluters. \textit{Cf.} Nash, supra note 195, at 476 n.31 (arguing that it is often debatable who the actual “polluter” is); Dale B. Thompson, Political Obstacles to the Implementation of Emissions Markets: Lessons from RECLAIM, 40 NAT. RESOURCES J. 645, 686–87 (2000) (discussing the practical difficulties of subjecting individuals to environmental regulation); Ann E. Carlson, Recycling Norms, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1295–1300 (2001) (to similar effect). But see Michael P. Vandenbergh, Order Without Social Norms: How Personal Norm Activation Can Protect the Environment, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1101, 1116–29 (2005) (arguing that “release reporting can be directed at individual behavior in a way that will effectively . . . provide the types of information necessary to activate norms,” which will “begin the process of changing direct and civic individual behavior”). And as a general matter, industrial polluters tend to be corporations, often sizable corporations, and often of considerable sophistication—in other words, precisely the type of societal actors one would expect to be best able to anticipate changes in the legal regime.

\textsuperscript{252} The general analytic framework that frowns upon transition relief assumes that, once the legal standard (whether the new rule or the rule that offers transition relief) is set, societal actors comply with the standard once and then a fortiori remain in compliance until the standard is changed. In other words, the framework assumes that compliance with the standard is not a constantly moving target but is instead aptly characterized as subject to punctuated equilibrium.

But this need not be the case and, in fact, is often not the case in environmental regulation. The dominant form of environmental regulation is command-and-control regulation that requires compliance with particular technological standards in order to satisfy the statutory and regulatory commands. Thus, the Clean Water Act requires that sources employ the “best available technology economically achievable” for toxic pollutants. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A) (2000). But while federal environmental laws often set a technological standard that remains constant over an extended period of time, the level of technology that constitutes the best available technology varies much more frequently because technology evolves. For example, the Clean Air Act’s mandate that the “best available technology” be used may be clear and may remain unchanged over an extended time horizon, but the level of technology that satisfies that legal standard is likely to, and indeed does, vary.

\textsuperscript{253} One also might argue that it is unfair to require actors who have just completed complying with the then-current standard to once again undertake costly compliance with a new standard. We elucidate this point in the next Section. \textit{See infra} Part IV.C.
plants is far less than the cost of installing such technology in existing plants. Thus, for example, assuming that statutes and regulations mandate particular technologies, it may make sense to protect societal actors who comply with the current mandatory technology level against changes in the technology level, at least for some reasonable period of time. In other words, the statute or regulation might provide for delayed implementation or phase-in of the new technology level, based presumably upon the actors’ reasonable investment expectations. This would retain at least some incentive for actors to anticipate changes in legal regime because an actor who voluntarily installed an advanced control system, which she anticipated would soon be required by law, would also be protected from further changes in the law for a reasonable period of time into the future. Such a system of time-limited transition relief would be superior to full grandfathering. Because the effects of the transition relief would be time-limited, all sources would eventually fall under the new standards.

The Clean Water Act to some extent implements this idea. The Act provides that if new standards for point sources are adopted within a ten-year “protection period,” the source can attain a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit which will exempt the source from complying with the newer standards.254

Even if such limited transition relief might be warranted under appropriate circumstances, the new regulations do not pass muster. First, grandfathering under the Clean Air Act provides protection from new standards even in the absence of new investment. Relief might have been limited to those plants with then-state-of-the-art pollution control equipment installed shortly before the enactment of the 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments. But, instead, the grandfathering applies across-the-board to all preexisting plants. In other words, the grandfathering regime provides no incentive to anticipate legal change at all.

The new regulations exacerbate this problem by shielding more modifications from new source review. The plants that benefit from these regulations have already enjoyed the benefits of grandfathering without the need to make any investment in anticipation of legal change. Moreover, plants will invest in modifications not because they anticipate a shift in the legal regime but rather because they are confident that they will not be subject to the new source standards. Unlike the safe harbor in the Clean Water Act, the new regulations provide protection even in the absence of new investment to comply with the new source standards. As such, the new regulations do not promote desirable incentive effects.255

Second, the new regulations extend indefinite relief. Once again, even the original grandfathering of existing sources as structured under the Clean

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Air Act is not reasonable by this measure. The extent to which transition relief would be available into the future could have been limited. But the preexisting grandfathering is not time-limited; in theory at least, it can continue indefinitely.

The new regulations exacerbate this problem by expanding the set of renovations and modifications that can be undertaken without triggering new source review. Thus, the new regulations increase the ability of sources that have already enjoyed grandfathering to enjoy the benefits of grandfathering over an even longer period of time. In short, the new regulations only entrench and intensify the indefinite incentive the Clean Air Act introduced for industry actors not to anticipate changes in the governing legal regime.

Transition relief is also inadvisable to the extent that it generally gives rise to a second type of undesirable incentive: an incentive for existing actors to try to preserve and extend transition relief so they can continue to extract the economic rents it creates. Rent-seeking occurs when societal actors invest time and effort to secure regulation that generates economic rents. Because it involves private actors using public authority to generate private gains, rent-seeking is generally seen as undesirable. Not only will groups inefficiently devote resources to obtain rent-generating regulations, but, once such regulations are in place, groups have the incentive to lobby to keep the regulations in place, to expand them, and to extend their lives.

Environmental grandfathering legislation and regulations produce rent for existing market participants. Grandfathering generates rent in the form of barriers to entry that protect existing industry actors from prospective competitors. These barriers to entry impose higher costs on prospective market entrants, thus allowing existing actors access to greater profits.

256 See supra Part I.D; Hsu, supra note 182, at 10,100 (“An enormous fraction of common repair and replacement activities can be accomplished for less than 20% of the original plant construction cost, and for those that typically cost more, plant owners will almost certainly find ingenious ways to gradually upgrade their plants in increments costing less than 20% of the original plant cost. . . . [Thus, the 20% safe harbor rule would] virtually guarantee[ ] that [New Source Review] will be never be triggered.” (footnote omitted)).


258 See id. at 226.

259 See Keohane et al., supra note 183, at 348–51; see also Hsu, supra note 222, at 42 (characterizing grandfathering in the context of new source review as an “invitation to rent-seeking”).

260 See Keohane et al., supra note 183, at 349–50 (“[F]irms regulated by a rent-generating instrument, such as command-and-control standards, will benefit if that instrument is linked to a mechanism that imposes barriers to entry. In theory, such a mechanism might prohibit new entry outright; a more politically feasible approach would impose higher costs on new entrants.”); Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation, 74 VA. L. REV. 339, 367 (1988) (“[O]ne of the more interesting examples of the interest-group theory in the literature pits high-cost firms against low-cost firms in an industry. The lat-
Insofar as the new regulations would expand the grandfathering regime, industry support for the new regulations is evidence of the incentive for existing industry actors to act to keep their competitive advantage intact and indeed to expand it.261

From a political economy perspective, it may be that in order to attain sufficient legislative and executive support to implement any change to the existing legal regime, some form of transition relief may be necessary as a compromise.262 As Saul Levmore puts it, the compromise entails the compensation of politically powerful losers by winners under the new policy in the form of rents generated by transition relief.263 To the extent that no change to the existing regime is possible otherwise, it may be that change to the legal regime in combination with transition relief is the best attainable outcome.264

Even accepting this premise, however, “compromise” is not a justification for the new regulations. The new regulations merely extend existing transition relief; transition relief is not coupled with the enactment of more stringent prospective regulations. In Levmore’s terms, there is no reason beyond pure lobbying power to compensate the politically powerful in this setting. Society gains no benefit in return for the extension of additional grandfathering.

C. Fairness

In the previous Section, we discussed the deleterious incentive effects presented by the new regulations. In this Section, we consider concerns of fairness. We conclude that even if fairness might justify limited transition relief in certain situations, fairness provides no basis for the new regulations’ extension of transition relief.265

In addition to the argument that incentive effects might warrant extending limited transition relief to actors who voluntarily comply with impending legal change,266 one can argue that it is unfair to require actors who have

261 Cf. Keohane et al., supra note 183, at 350 (“Although the theoretical arguments are strong, there are no conclusive empirical validations of these demand-side propositions. Direct empirical tests of firm demand for regulatory instruments (such as analyses of resources devoted to lobbying for such instruments as a function of firms’ stakes in an issue) are virtually nonexistent. Instead, most empirical work in this area simply seeks to measure the benefits an industry receives under regulation. Thus, the work examines not instrument demand itself, but rather the presumed product of such demand.”).
262 Kaplow, Legal Transitions, supra note 242, at 571–72.
263 Levmore, supra note 250, at 1665–66.
264 Id.
265 Cf. Kaplow, Legal Transitions, supra note 242, at 576–81 (surveying fairness-based justifications for transition relief and questioning whether those justifications are truly distinct from economic justifications).
266 See supra notes 252–53 and accompanying text.
invested in an upgrade before a new regulation takes effect to once again undertake costly compliance with a new standard.\textsuperscript{267} Thus, like considerations involving incentive effects, concerns of fairness may justify extending protection to societal actors who invest before a regulation takes effect for some reasonable period of time.

Such an approach generally accords with the concept of allowing investors a reasonable return on their investments before subjecting them to the broadly applicable new legal regime, and is not uncommon in the law of nonconforming uses.\textsuperscript{268} Nonconforming uses arise under zoning law when land uses prohibited by a new zoning ordinance predate the ordinance. The question arises as to how to deal with these now nonconforming uses. The continuation of the nonconforming uses might be outlawed, but the general view is that, unless an amortization period is provided, such an action might constitute a compensable taking under the Fifth Amendment, unless the uses were regulable nuisances.\textsuperscript{269} Some states permit the discontinuation of nonconforming uses without compensation after the owners have had a reasonable time to enjoy the fruits of the uses and, in effect, a reasonable opportunity to recoup their investments.\textsuperscript{270} Amortization constitutes a form of

\textsuperscript{267}See Shi-Ling Hsu, \textit{Fairness Versus Efficiency in Environmental Law}, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 303, 358–59 (2004) (identifying fairness concerns as one rationale underlying grandfathering rules such as new source review under the Clean Air Act).

\textsuperscript{268}See generally PATRICK ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS § 41.04 (2003). For early treatments, see generally C. McKim Norton, \textit{Elimination of Incompatible Uses and Structures}, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 305 (1955) and Note, \textit{Elimination of Nonconforming Uses}, 35 VA. L. REV. 348 (1949). See also Allan T. Fell, \textit{Amortization of Non-Conforming Uses}, 24 MD. L. REV. 323, 324–25 (1964) ("Non-conforming uses are usually continued with the expectation that they will eventually disappear through abandonment, destruction and other normal changes. Non-conforming uses, however, still abound, with the result that one of the primary zoning problems today is the elimination of non-conforming uses." (quoting Schiff v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 114 A.2d 644, 645 (Md. 1955))).

\textsuperscript{269}See, e.g., Village of Valatie v. Smith, 632 N.E.2d 1264 (N.Y. 1994); City of Corpus Christi v. Allen, 254 S.W.2d 759 (Tex. 1953).

\textsuperscript{270}See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 5410 (2003) (providing for a five-year amortization period for signs that do not conform to zoning restrictions); KAN. STAT. § 12-771 (2006) ("Nothing in this act is intended to prevent cities or counties from enforcing local laws, enacted under other legal authority, for the gradual elimination of nonconforming uses."); Livingston Rock & Gravel Co. v. Los Angeles County, 272 P.2d 4, 8–9 (Cal. 1954) ("[Z]oning legislation looks to the future in regulating district development and the eventual liquidation of nonconforming uses within a prescribed period commensurate with the investment involved."); City of Los Angeles v. Gage, 274 P.2d 34, 44 (Cal. App. 1954) (upholding a five-year amortization for non-residential uses in residential area, and explaining that "[u]se of a reasonable amortization scheme provides an equitable means of reconciliation of the conflicting interests in satisfaction of due process requirements"); Bd. of Zoning Appeals v. Leisz, 702 N.E.2d 1026, 1032 (Ind. 1998) (overruling prior precedent that amortization statutes were per se unconstitutional and noting that "[m]ost states allow local zoning authorities to phase out nonconforming uses with amortization provisions that require the owner to discontinue the nonconform use after a certain period of time"); Spurgeon v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Shawnee County, 317 P.2d 798 (Kan. 1957) (upholding as reasonable the elimination of nonconforming uses without compensation within two years); \textit{cf. IND. CODE ANN.} § 36-7-4-616 (2006) (protecting agricultural nonconforming uses in perpetuity).
transition relief; it is a form of delayed implementation of a new legal regime.

Along similar lines—although without the specter of the Fifth Amendment in the near-background—one might grant pollution sources that are in compliance with a preexisting legal standard a reasonable period of time before obligating them to upgrade their pollution control system to comply with the new standard.\textsuperscript{271} The reasonable period of time should be set by reference to the anticipated useful life of the technology, without reference to extensions in useful life that arise from the grandfathering itself, since fairness requires only that the investor receive a reasonable return on the investment.

The Clean Water Act implements this idea to some extent. As we noted above, the Act provides that if new standards for point sources are adopted within a ten-year “protection period,” the source can attain an NPDES permit, which will exempt the source from complying with the newer standards.\textsuperscript{272} The ten-year period can be seen as a proxy for the amortization of actors’ investments in the then-current technology.

Once again, even if a case can be made for limited transition relief on the basis of fairness, the new regulations are not reasonable. Indeed, even the preexisting grandfathering of preexisting sources as structured under the Clean Air Act is not appropriate because it can continue forever. Thus, its duration is no way linked to the amortization of societal actors’ investments. As discussed above, the new regulations exacerbate this problem. They extend even greater grandfathering protection without regard to the amortization of any investments.

Given that the anticipated useful life of plants in operation in 1970 extended at most thirty or forty years into the future,\textsuperscript{273} any argument that the owners of such plants should have the ability to amortize their investments is moot: They have already enjoyed the benefits of amortization. The only question now is whether those benefits should be extended even further. Since any reasonable form of transition relief has already been granted and exhausted, the presumption against transition relief strongly contradicts the new regulations’ further extension of grandfathering.

CONCLUSION

In this Article, we have argued that the EPA’s regulations, which make it easier for polluters to modernize without meeting the requirements of the Clean Air Act, are misguided. This extension of the original grandfathering contemplated in 1970 cannot be justified by reference to the economic

\textsuperscript{271} See Robertson, \textit{supra} note 1, at 173–76 (discussing the possibility of using amortization and other land-use devices in the environmental context); Varadarajan, \textit{supra} note 18, 2576–87.


\textsuperscript{273} See \textit{supra} notes 18–20 and accompanying text.
terms adduced by the Bush Administration. Quite the contrary, the new regulations may retard the introduction of new, clean plants and keep inefficient plants operating longer than they otherwise would. Moreover, grandfathering may make it more expensive for parts of the country to meet the national ambient air quality standards, which are the Clean Air Act’s centerpiece, and may give rise to perverse investment incentives.

While grandfathering may be appropriate in certain circumstances, there is little justification for expanding preexisting grandfathering, as the EPA regulations do. The plants that are the major beneficiaries of the policy have already exceeded their anticipated useful lives. Their owners have more than reaped the return they could reasonably have anticipated on their investments. The original grandfathering, in fact, has already led them to operate longer than they would have if the Clean Air Act had never been enacted.

More generally, we have argued that grandfathering may be appropriate in environmental regulation to the extent that installing and upgrading pollution control equipment in existing plants may be both logistically difficult and expensive. A reasonable amortization period might be offered to plants that invest so as to comply with existing environmental standards. In contrast, it makes little sense to offer grandfathering in perpetuity, extensions of preexisting grandfathering benefits, and grandfathering benefits without receiving some concession in return. Congress and the EPA would do well to limit grandfathering rather than to expand it, and, if they do choose to extend it, to do so only in return for some specific benefit that is sufficiently compelling. Unfortunately, the history of grandfathering under the Clean Air Act has been quite different.